Healthy Competition: Federalism and Environmental Impact Assessment in Canada - 1985-1995 by Greenwood, David
 
HEALTHY COMPETITION: FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
 










presented to the University of Waterloo 
 
in fulfillment of the 
 
thesis requirement for the degree of 
 






















Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2004 
 
 
© David Jonathan Greenwood 2004 
 
 ii  
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this the is. This is a true copy of the thesis, 
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 
 






































 iii  
Abstract 
 
 The effect of federalism on the development of public policy is a widely debated 
topic. In terms of environmental policy, this issue assumes greater importance because of 
the lack of clarity in the constitutional division f powers.  It is the purpose of this research 
to examine environmental impact assessment (EIA) – one of the higher-profile aspects of 
environmental policy – in order to establish how intergovernmental relations in Canada 
have affected policy and process development in this area.  It is hypothesized that unilateral 
federal action in this policy area contributes to a corresponding increase in the stringency of 
provincial EIA processes.  To test this, a two-step analysis is adopted: first analyzing 
developments at both the federal and provincial levels from 1985-1995 – a period which 
witnessed exceptionally high levels of public concer  for the environment and increased 
federal involvement in EIA – and second discussing key events and agreements which 
affected intergovernmental relations and determining whether these related to those 
developments identified.  This research finds that greater federal involvement in EIA was a 
catalyst for some positive reform at the provincial level, although this result varied 
significantly between the provinces examined.  Based on the evidence gathered, it is 
concluded that some form of intergovernmental collab r tion and competition both have a 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Rationale 
 
 Environmental protection has gradually evolved into a significant and pressing issue 
over the last 30 years.  Parson (2000) describes it as “…the most prominent new domain of 
politics and public policy to arise over the last few decades, in Canada and internationally” 
(p. S123).  Concern over environmental degradation has been fuelled by events such as the 
publishing of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 and the sinking of the Exxon Valdez in 
1989 (Harrison, 1996).  Internationally, perhaps the most well-known initiative was the 
publishing of the 1987 report Our Common Future by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development – commonly known as the Brundtland Commission – 
which recommended adoption of the practice of sustainable development as a means to 
integrate environmental protection and economic development.  Canadian officials at both 
the federal and provincial levels have generally spoken very favourably about this 
recommendation (Rabe, 1997).   
Canadian environmental legislation has largely developed in fits and starts, with a 
flurry of legislation in the early 1970s and a similar level of activity around 1990 
(Skogstad, 1996).  The first major piece of environme tal legislation in North America 
during these periods was, however, the American 1969 National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) that established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The EPA was given 
extensive powers to enforce federal standards, which led to the analogy that it served as a 
“…gorilla in the closet” that the states could call upon to ensure industry compliance 
(Tobin, 1992).  The NEPA also introduced North America’s first Environmental 
Assessment Review Process.  Canada introduced such a process at the federal level in 1973 
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and, by 1984, it had become the Environmental Assessm nt Review Process Guidelines 
Order (EARPGO).  At this point, it was considered by the federal government to be a non-
binding process applied at its discretion to proposed projects it felt warranted such attention 
(Doern & Donway, 1994).  Around 1990, however, a series of court rulings interpreted the 
EARPGO as a binding document requiring federal Departments to conduct environmental 
assessments (EAs) on a wide variety of proposals previously overlooked.  At the same 
time, opinion polls were detecting unprecedented levels of public concern for 
environmental degradation (Harrison, 1996).   
Over the next few years, reviews of federal and provincial environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) processes were conducted across Canada and several new pieces of 
legislation were put into place.  As Chapter 4 will show, each of the five western provinces 
– from British Columbia to Ontario – initiated some form of review of their EIA process 
around 1990 and made changes which increased the stringency of these processes.  The 
results of these reviews, however, varied significantly.  Saskatchewan and Manitoba 
undertook limited reforms, the former through departmental guidelines and the latter 
through legislative amendments.  Ontario also did relatively little.  The federal government, 
British Columbia and Alberta, meanwhile, passed new l gislation which dramatically 
improved the stringency of their EIA processes.  Despit  the differences in the degree of 
reforms, however, the almost simultaneous nature of many of these reforms begs the 
question of whether they were interrelated.    
It is contended here that there was such an interrelation and that due attention must 
be paid to Canada’s federal structure.  Not only is juri diction over the environment sharply 
divided between the federal and provincial governmets, but Canada is often divided over 
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what federalism should mean.  Bakvis and Skogstad (2002), for example, see the very 
legitimacy of the Canadian federal system as challenged by its failure to adequately 
accommodate Quebec within itself.  Meanwhile, others argue the merits of centralization 
versus decentralization as solutions to problems such as ensuring national standards while 
allowing enough room for policy experimentation.  Canadian public policy, therefore, 
cannot be developed in a vacuum, but must be considered alongside issues such as 
jurisdiction and with the broader political framework of the time in mind.   
1.2 Purpose and Objectives 
 
While many authors have dealt with the effects of federalism on the development of 
environmental policy, it was felt that a detailed evaluation of the role of intergovernmental 
interaction in the development of federal and provincial EIA policy during and after the 
wave of reforms around 1990 would permit clarification of this interrelationship.  The aim 
of this research is therefore to identify this role.  It is hypothesized that the uncharacteristic 
degree of unilateral federal action around this time contributed to an increase in stringency 
of those provincial EIA processes examined.  The obj ctives of this research are threefold: 
1) To describe the constitutional division of powers as they relate to environmental 
policy and to discuss patterns in intergovernmental rel tions in this area. 
2) To develop an evaluative framework that will not only assess the changes made in 
EIA processes, but will also allow for identification of the effects of 
intergovernmental interaction on these processes. 
3) To identify lessons from this analysis for some of the broader debates concerning 
Canadian federalism and environmental policy. 
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1.3 Thesis Organization 
 
The following chapters present the context, methodology, evaluation, findings and 
conclusions of this research.  Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature 
surrounding federalism and environmental policy.  Chapter 3 presents the research 
approach and methodology, including the development of the evaluative framework, as 
well as data collection.  Chapter 4 comprises the first step in the evaluative framework 
through the development of criteria to identify increases in stringency of the EIA processes 
examined from 1985, when public concern over the enviro ment first began to rise beyond 
normal levels, to 1995, when the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAAct) was 
proclaimed.  It also seeks commonalities in the specific improvements undertaken across 
jurisdictions.  Chapter 5 completes the evaluation by examining major events and initiatives 
in federal-provincial relations during and after this period.  These include: court cases 
dealing with three prominent projects – the Rafferty and Alameda dams in Saskatchewan, 
the Oldman River dam in Alberta and the James Bay II h droelectric project in Quebec; the 
development and amendment of the CEAAct; and the various stages of the 
intergovernmental environmental harmonization initiative that began in the mid-1990s.  
Bilateral relations between each of the provinces selected and the federal government are 
also examined in an attempt to better identify and explain any differences between 
provinces.  In addition, Chapter 5 presents public opinion data from around 1990 to help 
determine whether changes in the EIA processes examined can be adequately explained as 
independent responses to the same pressure.  Finally, Chapter 6 draws conclusions about 
the different ways increased federal involvement has affected the provincial processes, the 
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different approaches and priorities both orders of government bring to EIA and how these 























Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter will provide a review of the relevant literature in order to better 
understand the debates surrounding the effect of federalism on environmental policy.  
Initially, it will be necessary to discuss the constitutional division of powers in Canada as it 
applies to the environment.  Such an overview will reveal that the provinces are accorded a 
clearer responsibility, but that the federal governme t retains several important sources of 
authority which have been bolstered by court rulings over the last 20 years.  Next, the 
subject of federalism itself will be addressed in order to demonstrate some of the different 
perceptions of what federalism means, what its purpose is and what are its strengths and 
weaknesses.  These questions are directly related to two broad debates on how divided 
jurisdiction affects the development of environmental policy.  The first debate involves 
whether effective policy reform and implementation is best achieved through 
intergovernmental collaboration or competition, while the second debate concerns which 
level of government is best suited to provide stringe t environmental policy.  It will be seen 
that the hypothesis presented in chapter 1 is based l rgely in the first of these debates, but 
that research relating to this hypothesis have implications for the second debate.  Different 
arguments relevant to both debates will be presented with the goal that the subsequent 
research may reinforce the validity of some of these positions. 
2.1 The Constitution 
 
Not surprisingly, the Fathers of Confederation did not directly address the issue of 
authority over environmental policy.  Thus, not only is this government authority based on 
 
 7 
other elements of constitutional jurisdiction (Benidickson, 1997), but it is also quickly 
apparent that: 
…the environment is not an independent matter of legis ation under the Constitution Act, 
1867 and that it is a constitutionally abstruse matter which does not comfortably fit within 
the existing division of powers without considerable overlap and uncertainty… (Friends of 
the Oldman River v Canada [1992]) 
 
Despite this uncertainty, an overview of the constitutional division of powers reveals that 
the provinces have a much clearer and more direct rsponsibility for environmental 
protection. 
The backbone of provincial power in environmental policy is found in the 
inextricable link between environmental protection and natural resources.  To begin with, 
the Constitution Act, 1867 gives the provinces control over “All Lands, Mines, Minerals, 
and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces of Canada” [s.107], although Alberta and 
Saskatchewan did not gain control over their own natural resources until 1930.  This clause 
has also allowed for significant rights of access to other resources such as water found on 
those lands (Harrison 1996).  This situation is in tark contrast to that of the United States, 
where the federal government owns much of the land u er the public lands clause 
(Kincaid 1996).  Furthermore, in 1982 Section 92A reaffirmed this ownership by stating 
that provinces could exclusively make laws in relation to exploration for non-renewable 
natural resources [1a] and development, conservation and management of forestry 
resources [1b] and “sites and facilities in the province for the generation and production of 
electrical energy” [1c].  It should be noted, however, that non-renewable resources apart 
from the two explicitly mentioned were deliberately xcluded from this amendment due to 
federal concern that a more general commitment might impact federal jurisdiction over 
areas such as fish and agriculture.  Nor, significantly, did the provinces gain a greater 
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constitutional role in international trade of resources or limit the application of the Peace, 
Order and Good Government (POGG) clause (Meekison & Romanow, 1985). 
Provincial ability to legislate in the area of environmental protection also comes 
from several other clauses in Section 92.  The provinces are responsible for “The 
Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the Province and of the Timber and 
Wood thereon” [s.92(5)], “Municipal Institutions” [s.92(8)], “Local Works and 
Undertakings” [s.92(10)], “Property and Civil Rights in the Province” [s.92(13)] and 
“Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province” [s.92[16]).  It is 
important to note here that these powers are limited to matters within the province.  As 
mentioned above, one of the main arguments of advocates of more federal involvement in 
environmental policy is the transboundary nature of environmental problems.  Stevenson 
(1985), for example, pointedly notes that “[F]ish are notorious for their disregard of 
provincial or even national boundaries” (p. 83).  This statement could also equally apply to 
resources such as water and air.  Finally, the provinces are responsible for enforcement in 
these areas through “The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for 
enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation  any Matter coming within any of the 
Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section” [s.92(15)]. 
The federal government, by contrast, has, at least at face value, a much less clear 
constitutional base on which to act in the area of environmental protection.  It is responsible 
for “Navigation and Shipping” [s.91(10)], federal works and undertakings [ss.91(29) & 
92(10)], “Indians, and lands reserved for the Indias” [s.91(24)] and a variety of “Public 
Works and Property of each Province” including canals, harbours, lighthouses and railways 
[s.108 & 3rd schedule].  In addition, the federal government is responsible for “Sea Coast 
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and Inland Fisheries” [s.91(12)], a power which hasbeen perhaps the most commonly used 
justification for federal involvement.  The Supreme Court in the 1980s displayed a 
willingness to accept encroachment on provincial jurisdiction under the Fisheries Act as 
long as the legislation made a clear link between th  regulation and the prevention of harm 
to fisheries (Benidickson, 1997).  This is important because, as with almost all aspects of 
environmental policy, the fishery is not free of constitutional overlap.  As Harrison (1996) 
notes, while Ottawa retains regulatory power over th  fishery, the provinces, as the owners 
of many of the beds of the water bodies, have also been recognized to have ownership 
rights over the actual fish. 
Beyond these areas, the federal government is accorded four other more general 
powers that have become important for Canadian enviro mental policy.  It shall be seen 
that the evolution of these powers indicates a noticeable willingness on the part of Canada’s 
senior courts to interpret the federal environmental role quite broadly.  In the 1992 Oldman 
River case, La Forest J. affirmed the legitimate use of such general powers by writing that 
environmental regulation must be achieved “…by looking first at the catalogue of powers 
in the Constitution Act, 1867 and considering how they may be employed to meet or av id 
environmental concerns” (Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada).  First amongst 
these powers is “The Regulation of Trade and Commerce” [s.91(2)].  In 1994 the Supreme 
Court ruled in the case of Quebec (Attorney General) v Canada (National Energy Board) 
that the National Energy Board, which had issued an export permit to Hydro-Quebec for 
the proposed second phase of the James Bay hydroelect ic development under the federal 
Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order (EARPGO), could attach 
conditions to this approval stating that the construction of future generating plants would 
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require environmental assessments.  In so doing, it rejected the argument made by the 
Quebec Attorney General and Hydro-Quebec that the fed ral assessment should be limited 
exclusively to matters dealing with the actual physical exporting of the power, such as the 
power lines: “If in applying this Act the Board finds environmental effects within a 
province relevant to its decision to grant an export licence, a matter of federal jurisdiction, 
it is entitled to consider those effects.”  This clause is, however, limited by the fact that it 
has been historically interpreted to apply to interational and interprovincial trade, but not 
to intraprovincial trade (Benidickson, 1997).  Nor can inter ational agreements – trade or 
otherwise – be used to infringe unnecessarily on provincial jurisdiction.  As explained in 
the ruling of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the 1937 Labour Conventions 
case: “[T]he Dominion cannot, merely by making promises to foreign countries, clothe 
itself with legislative authority inconsistent with e constitution which gave it birth…” 
(Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney-General for Ontario, 1937).  There has been 
speculation that the federal government, if it so desired, might be able to override this latter 
point by using the second of its general powers: the POGG clause. 
 The POGG clause has become an important source of l gitimacy for federal 
environmental initiatives due to the development of its ‘national concern’ doctrine.  This 
doctrine was fleshed out by Le Dain J. in R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd [1988]:  
2     The national concern doctrine applies to both new matters which did not exist at 
Confederation and to matters which, although originally matters of a local or private nature 
in a province, have since, in the absence of nationl emergency, become matters of national 
concern; 
3     For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern in either sense it must have a 
singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of 
provincial concern and a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with 
the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the Constitution; 
4     In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree of singleness, 
distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial 
concern it is relevant to consider what would be the effect on extra-provincial interests of a 
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provincial failure to deal effectively with the control or regulation of the intra-provincial 
aspects of the matter. 
 
In this case, the majority held that Section 4(1) of the federal Ocean Dumping Act, which 
prohibits dumping of substances at sea without a permit, was justifiable as marine pollution 
could be classified as a ‘national concern.’  An interesting comment that illustrates the 
potentially controversial nature of the doctrine is found in the dissent by La Forest J.:  
All physical activities have some environmental impact … To allocate the broad subject-
matter of environmental control to the federal government … would effectively gut 
provincial legislative jurisdiction and sacrifice the principles of federalism enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
 
Since this ruling, speculation about what might constitute a ‘national concern’ has been 
widespread.  An interesting case would be if the constitutionality of the Kyoto Protocol 
were challenged, since air pollution would seem to stand a good chance of meeting the 
standard of “singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibil ty.”  Analysts tend to agree that the 
Crown Zellerbach ruling would support an increased federal role in environmental policy 
(Hanebury, 1991; Jaeger, 1993).  How the federal government has responded to this will be 
discussed following the remaining two broad federal powers: criminal law and the spending 
power. 
 Federal responsibility over criminal law [s.91(27)] is the most recent example of 
judicial willingness to interpret Ottawa’s powers broadly in relation to the environment.  In 
a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in the 1997 case of R v Hydro-Quebec that the 
criminal law power was an acceptable tool for environmental protection.  La Forest J., 
writing for the majority, states: “[S]tewardship ofthe environment is a fundamental value 
of our society … The Criminal law must be able to keep pace with and protect our 
emerging values.”  By contrast, the concerns of the dissenting opinion, delivered by Lamer 
C.J. and Iacobucci J. again emphasize raise jurisdict onal issues: “…wholesale regulatory 
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authority of the type envisaged … is, in our view, inconsistent with the shared nature of 
jurisdiction over the environment.” 
 The final federal responsibility that must be considered is also one of the oldest: the 
spending power.  While this is not specifically defin d in the constitution, it has been one 
of the more commonly used tools by the federal governm nt to exercise influence over a 
variety of policy areas (Brooks, 1997).  In terms of environmental policy, the spending 
power has been used mainly through Environment Canada’s monitoring and enforcement 
activities.  As Harrison (1996) notes, this marks a significant difference when compared to 
the federal government in the United States due to the lack of federal funding of provincial 
environmental programs.  The American federal governm nt, which gained the right to 
attach regulatory conditions to grants in 1937, hasoften used its spending power to 
influence environmental policy at the state level (Kincaid, 1996).  Why a similar course of 
action has not been followed in Canada leads into a discussion of how the Canadian 
governments have operated in a policy area with sucan ambiguous division of powers. 
2.2 Federalism and Public Policy 
 
 It is impossible to analyze the development of environmental policy in Canada 
without a discussion of the institutional ‘rules of the game.’  These rules provide the setting 
for the formulation of public policy and have increasingly been attributed with an 
independent ability to shape this formulation.  In Canada, one of the most important 
institutions is federalism and the constitutional division of powers between the two orders 
of government.  There are, however, many different interpretations of federalism’s effects.  
Black and Cairns (1966) envision a series of dirigiste provincial governments which use 
their expanding bureaucratic capacity to push for me and more devolution, while Fletcher 
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and Wallace (1985) see federal-provincial conflict as limiting the development of public 
policy.  Part of the explanation for these differenc s must come from the different 
assumptions authors make about what federalism means.  It is argued that such a 
divergence in assumptions is noticeable between the fed ral and provincial governments 
and their supporters in environmental policy and that it contributes to differences in policy 
priorities.  Some may, for instance, place tremendous value on achieving some form of 
national standard, while others may prioritize flexibility and experimentation above all else. 
 Perhaps most fundamentally, there is divergence concerning the purpose of 
federalism.  Vipond (1991), for example, identifies two competing traditions in Canada: 
one which emphasizes individual liberty and typically looks to the central government to 
protect this liberty; and the other which focuses more on substate communities and sees 
regional governments as their protectors.  The former is illustrated well by Trudeau (1968), 
who writes about the relationship between individual C nadians and the central government 
that: “…the whole of the citizenry must be made to feel that it is only within the framework 
of the federal state that their language, culture, institutions, sacred traditions, and standard 
of living can be protected from external attack and internal strife” (p. 193).  The latter is 
evident when Gagnon and Laforest (1993) state: 
…[F]or federalism to be legitimate, the imposition f instrumentalities that conflict with the 
interests of the federating nations must be avoided.  The original compact (real or 
understood) made between the nations of Canada was based on the understanding that the 
agreement would allow for diverse means of continued d velopment and the establishment 
of the necessary instruments to strengthen their respective national aspirations within the 
newly formed political entity (p. 484). 
 
On a practical level, Smiley’s (1977) model of inter- and intrastate federalism is a good 
representation of the two, while Cairns (1992) demonstrates the tension between the two 
over the issue of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Norrie, Simeon and 
 
 14 
Krasnick (1986) propose three different interpretations of Canadian federalism: one which 
emphasizes the need for national standards in areasranging from the economy to individual 
rights; one which sees Canada as the creation of ‘tw  founding nations’ that need to be 
recognized either through means such as official bilingualism or asymmetry; and one which 
argues for provincial diversity and a strong provincial role in national policy. 
    Where one stands on the purpose of federalism is sure to influence the importance 
one attaches to federalism’s strengths and weaknesses.  The ability of the various 
governments to experiment in policy development is one of the most commonly cited 
strengths.  In the Canadian case, perhaps the best-known example is the introduction of 
universal hospital and medical insurance in Saskatchewan and its subsequent diffusion 
across the country (Noel, 1999).  A second major strength is the protection of minorities 
from oppression (Whitaker, 1983).  The protection offered here is not the kind of 
enshrinement of individual rights offered in the Charter, but rather a fragmentation of 
authority so that territorially-based minorities become majorities within that territory.  As 
stated by Norrie et al (1986): 
[A] central question for the design of federations is not so much whether the majority 
should rule but rather which majority should rule on any given question.  Ideally, the 
Constitution should say that for a certain set of purposes the community is the country… 
but for another set of purposes, the relevant communities are provincial and it is there that 
majority rule should operate.  A claim that either kind of majority is inherently superior is 
hostile to federalism (p. 19). 
 
 Two major issues often raised can be identified as weaknesses of federalism.  The 
first is based on the desirability of simplicity and accountability in government.  A 
sufficiently complex division of powers risks making it unclear to citizens who is 
responsible for what (Stevenson, 1985).  This may allow for buck-passing between 
governments when the public is looking for someone to blame.  The second weakness 
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involves the possibility that there are: “…ineradicable tendencies to conflict between the 
federal vision of a society and economy and ten competing provincial visions” that must be 
managed (Cairns, 1988, p. 167).  In Canada, the practice of executive federalism and its 
often-criticized secretive decision-making process ha developed partially to contain these 
tendencies (Brock, 1995). 
 Given the extent of jurisdictional overlap, Canadian environmental policy has 
historically been surprisingly free of intergovernmental conflict (Dwivedi & Woodrow, 
1989).  Thus, it does not fit comfortably with Stevenson’s (1985) picture of a Canadian 
federation “…characterized by conflict and controversy” (p. 71), nor with Cairns’ (1988) 
statement that federal and provincial governments are “…aggressive actors steadily 
extending their tentacles of control, regulation and manipulation into society…” (p. 151).  
Instead, environmental policy has largely been one of provincial control uncontested by the 
federal government, which remains mostly content to play a supporting role through 
research and the development of a few national standards in consultation with the provinces 
(Harrison, 1994).  Before discussing why the federal government would willingly cede 
authority to the provinces, however, it is valuable to explore several factors that might lead 
to neither level of government acting in the manner predicted by the dirigiste model. 
 There are an exceptional number of barriers – bothinstitutional and societal – to the 
development of environmental policy in Canada.  Harrison (1996) states that 
“Environmental protection typically involves diffuse benefits and concentrated costs…” (p. 
5).  What is meant by this is that, while the benefits of environmental regulation would be 
diffused across society as a whole, the costs will largely be borne by a small group of 
regulated industries.  Not only is it likely that this small group will be more sensitive to 
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attempts to make regulations more stringent, but the owners of these regulated industries 
are often in a position to “…offer politicians more than just votes…” (Harrison, 1996, p. 
14).  Representatives of these industries, on the ot r hand, argue that their concern is more 
with avoiding unnecessary duplication and delay than with avoiding regulation (Bérubé & 
Cusson, 2002).  Rabe (1999), however, sees a pattern where the provincial governments 
avoid implementing anything beyond symbolic measure b cause of a fear of aggravating 
existing relationships with industry. 
 This reluctance to change the way things are done also extends to intragovernmental 
relationships.  Winfield (1994) refers to environmental policy as “the ultimate horizontal 
issue” because of its necessary infringement on many other policy fields and requirement 
that other Ministries or Departments reassess traditional methods of economic development 
(pp. 129-130).  The Minister of the Environment then is often set against many members of 
the Cabinet who resent this perceived intrusion.  Occasionally, a Minister of the 
Environment has sought allies outside of their Cabinet, as indicated by the extraordinary 
case of Quebec’s Pierre Paradis, who in 1990 publicly went against his government by 
calling for a more forceful federal environmental assessment of phase two of the James Bay 
project (Montreal Gazette, 23/11/90).  The reluctance shown by Sheila Copps, federal 
Minister of the Environment in 1995, over the Environmental Management Framework 
Agreement, is another example of the figurative isolati n in which an Environment 
Minister can find themselves (Fafard, 1997).  Both f these examples shall be revisited 
again in Chapter 5. 
 The main societal influence on environmental policy is the nature of public concern 
about the environment.  Harrison (1996) points out the distinction between what she calls 
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“trends in public concern” and “trends in salience of environmental issues” (p. 57).  The 
former is measured by closed-ended questions which ask about environmental problems, 
such as ‘Do you consider pollution to be an important issue?’  The latter is measured 
through open-ended questions which rank the environment against other issues, such as 
‘What are the top three problems facing Canada today?’  Harrison finds that, when 
explicitly asked about the environment, a high percentage will express concern.  However, 
there have really only been two periods in Canadian h story when the environment ranked 
high on the latter measure: in the late 1960s and the late 1980s.  If one is to judge which 
measure is more important based on when governments have acted in the environmental 
field, then certainly the latter measure stands out.  As Parson (2000) states:  
Citizen concern for the environment has been persist ntly mixed, labile, and ambiguous, 
only infrequently reaching and holding the intensity required to provoke major policy 
change.  Moreover, citizens’ declared concern for the environment often exceeds the 
evidence of concern discernible in their major consumption choices such as residence and 
transport.  Consequently, governments most often trat environmental protection as a 
secondary priority… (p. 139). 
 
In other words, citizens may pay lip service to environmental protection most of the time, 
but it takes a significant event to make them take it seriously.  Good examples would 
include the exposure of the harmful effects of DDT in the mid-1960s and the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in 1989.   
These trends in public opinion have an added importance for Canadian 
environmental interest groups according to Hoberg (1997) who argues that, in the 
American system, the added emphasis on ‘legalism’ – using the courts – allows interest 
groups another way to influence the government agenda.  In Canada, by contrast, “You can 
call a press conference, and that’s about it” (p. 355), although the courts have taken an 
increasingly activist role over the past 15 years.  Moreover, the horizontal fragmentation 
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between executive and legislature within the American federal government has been 
attributed by some not only with leading to upward p essure on environmental standards 
during times of high public attention due to competition between the two branches, but also 
with impeding the rolling back of these standards when public attention wanes (Hoberg, 
1997; Harrison, 2000b).  One of the big questions i an analysis of federalism and 
environmental policy in Canada is whether this country’s system of vertical fragmentation 
between federal and provincial governments has had the same effect. 
 Such a question serves as a good introduction to the first of two debates over the 
effect of federalism and public policy that are especially relevant to an analysis of Canadian 
environmental policy.  First, there is a debate over th  ideal model of intergovernmental 
interaction in a policy area where it is increasingly accepted that both orders of government 
must be involved.  Norrie et al (1986) present two possible models of interaction: 
collaboration and competition.  Advocates of the former focus on the avoidance of 
unnecessary costs.  These costs are not only the perc iv d economic costs of overlap but 
also the political costs that may arise if the public ecomes tired of government infighting.  
An excellent example of this is the first Mulroney government’s promise to ‘renew 
federalism’ through a more collaborative intergovernmental approach (Brooks, 1997).  
Simeon (2000) characterizes this approach as “collab rative federalism,” meaning:  
…an intergovernmental process through which national policies are achieved not by the 
federal government acting alone, nor by its coercing provincial action through its spending 
power, but rather by some or all of the 11 governmets and territories acting collectively 
(p.238). 
 
Courchene (1996) regards this as an almost inevitable consequence of the significant 
budget cuts of the 1990s.  His proposed rebalancing of the federation, although geared 
towards economic and social policy, is significant for environmental policy as well.  Ideas 
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such as the replacement of ‘federal’ standards with‘national’ standards – that is, standards 
agreed upon cooperatively rather than imposed from Ottawa – have already been put into 
operation in the area of environmental policy, as the later discussion of the Canadian 
Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) will show.  Dwivedi and Woodrow 
(1989) emphasize the ability of federal-provincial bureaucratic task forces and committees 
to overlook “jurisdictional wrangling” in favour of dividing responsibilities according to 
which government is best suited to each task.  An important point to be made here is that 
support for collaboration can often also come from utside governments.  Harrison (1994) 
describes how industry is often vehemently opposed to having to comply with two different 
sets of environmental regulations.      
 Those who advocate competition between governments are much less concerned 
with the cost of overlap; or, perhaps more appropriately, much more willing to bear any 
cost incurred.  Certainly the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada (1985) felt some costs were the unavoidable consequences of 
maintaining a balanced federation:  
Co-operation between the two orders of government ca not be the essence of federalism or 
the dominant criterion which should inform our evaluation of federalism’s performance: 
carried to such extremes, the stress on co-operation destroys federalism … each 
government has an autonomous capacity to act, and the exercise of such authority is not 
only proper, but a necessary consequence of federalism (vol.1, p.68).   
 
Instead of avoiding duplication, then, the “dominant criterion” for supporters of 
competition is the assumed increase in government responsiveness, since citizens who do 
not have their interests met by one government can turn to the other (Norrie t al, 1986).  
Brown (1994) presents the argument that one could perceive no overlap even in areas 
where both the federal and provincial governments are active if one believes them to be 
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fulfilling different functions and Brander (1985) sees the possibility of competition creating 
upward pressure on policy development. 
 It should also be added that there is often a suspicion amongst supporters of 
competition that efforts at collaboration are merely fforts at de facto decentralization.  
Breton (1985), for instance, argues:  
Co-operative federalism, because it proscribes unilateral action, is therefore a disguised 
ploy to shackle the federal government, to prevent it from addressing the problems it alone 
can resolve and is constitutionally responsible for resolving.  Indeed, condemning federal 
unilateralism is condemning the federal government for acting constitutionally! (p.493) 
 
Cameron and Simeon (2002) characterize adherents of “collaborative federalism” as 
“mostly provincial governments and their supporters” (p.49) and see efforts at 
environmental harmonization over the last decade as involving a significant degree of 
delegation of federal authority.  This argument canbe slightly altered to illustrate another 
criticism of collaborative federalism; that the federal government is willingly ‘shackling’ 
itself in order to avoid acting in areas of environmental policy.  Harrison (1996) has 
presented what is perhaps the most developed argument along these lines. 
Apart from the reasons for governments not to wish to act in the area of 
environmental policy which have already been described, two other barriers to action may 
be attributed exclusively to Canada’s federal government.  The first one – the constitutional 
division of powers and the indirect nature of federal constitutional responsibility for 
environmental protection – has been discussed.  Thesecond is well-described by Lucas 
(1986) as Canada’s “political constitution” (p. 35).  This is the idea that the federal 
government must take care not to needlessly offend provincial sensitivities through 
perceived encroachment into provincial areas of respon ibility. 
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Over the past 30 years, then, Ottawa has actively sought to avoid conflict over 
environmental policy.  As a policy area which catches the public eye only infrequently, it is 
generally agreed that the federal government has proved willing to make concessions here 
in order to focus on more pressing goals (Lucas, 1986; Skogstad, 1996).  There are several 
good examples of this.  After provincial complaints that the Environmental Protection 
Service (EPS) division of Environment Canada was being too aggressive in enforcing the 
Fisheries Act in 1978, EPS was ordered to back off (Doern & Conway, 1994).  As one 
former senior official said: “The message got through.  If EPS officials had tried rigorous 
enforcement, they would have got their fingers rapped” (p. 219).  This resulted in nominal 
federal setting of base standards without any means to enforce them.  The 1971 Clean Air 
Act, unflatteringly called “…a hollow shell of the US Clean Air Act” by Harrison (2000b, p. 
57), is another good example.  Its goal was to establi h national air quality objectives.  
However, unlike in the US, no deadlines were set.  Nor was there a national enforcement 
regime.  Ottawa could only set emissions standards if the provincial government chose to 
adopt the federal air quality objectives.  This approach left much to be desired, as broad 
discrepancies in enforcement across provinces emerged and Canada had, in general, “a 
weak enforcement regime everywhere” (Skogstad, 1996, p. 111).  A third example is the 
early attitude of the Mulroney government, which had come to power in 1984 on a promise 
to ‘renew federalism.’  Suzanne Blais-Grenier was Mulroney’s first Environment Minister 
and instructed her officials to get along with the provinces (Doern & Conway, 1994, p. 
181).  Along with a 14% cut in the Department’s budget, this left Environment Canada 
severely weakened its ability to act. 
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The fact that exceptional circumstances seem to be required to spur the federal 
government to action is disappointing to those who see value in intergovernmental 
competition; in this case, that federal unilateralism, or even the threat of federal 
unilateralism, may serve as a catalyst for provincial action.  This argument is based on 
provincial hypersensitivity to federal action in the environmental arena.  In Quebec, for 
instance, federal environmental action is often opposed by the provincial government as 
part of the larger struggle for increased autonomy (Brown, 1994).  In Alberta, meanwhile, 
the unbreakable link between environment and natural resources is a paramount concern.  
Skogstad notes that, in Alberta, “environmental policy is energy policy,” (p. 109), while the 
Mulroney government’s 1990 Green Plan was heavily cr ticized after the Deputy Minister 
of Environment Canada had supposedly referred to it as the “son of NEP” (Dabbs, 1990).  
This view necessarily conflicts with the ‘collaborative federalism’ model in which national 
standards are determined by the federal and provincial governments, or occasionally by 
only the latter.  These authors, however, generally see the environmental benefit of the 
initiative as outweighing the ‘cost’ of intergovernmental disharmony.  Thompson (1980) 
notes an increase in provincial activity following the 1970 Canada Water Act, while Doern 
and Conway (1994) attribute the development of provincial environmental impact 
assessment procedures in the late 1970s to anticipated federal action.  In an analysis of the 
environmental harmonization initiative of the mid-1990s, Winfield (2002) further warns of 
the risks of rejecting competition outright:  
Good intergovernmental relations were seen to becom an end in themselves, necessary to 
demonstrate the potential for reform of the federation.  However, the results of the 
harmonization experience to date suggest that good intergovernmental relations do not 
necessarily equal good substantive policy outcomes.  The race to the bottom that has been 
occurring among provinces over the past few years is continuing … [T]he earlier era of 





 Such a statement introduces the second major debate concerning federalism and 
environmental policy: which level of government is more likely to implement stringent 
policies and legislation?  This question immediately becomes caught up in the overarching 
struggle between supporters of centralization and decentralization.  It should be noted here 
that these terms are used to mean a shift of policy control either towards the national 
government or towards the subnational governments ad that neither term is intended to 
indicate support for the outright abdication of one order of government from a policy field.  
Proponents of the former emphasize the federal governm nt’s ability to control 
interprovincial ‘spillovers,’ as concluded by Nemetz (1986).  They also favour centralized 
policy-making to take advantage of economies of scale in certain policy areas, and support 
the ability of the federal government to resist regionally dominant interests and to prevent 
the much-debated possibility of a ‘race to the bottom’ (Harrison, 2000b).  An interesting 
example of this latter point is the case of the move to control acidic emissions in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  When asked whether he would toughen emissions standards on INCO Limited 
– a major employer in Sudbury – then-Premier of Ontario Bill Davis stated: “I am not 
prepared to have the government create an economic problem for the city of Sudbury.  We 
can’t do this in isolation” (quoted in Cataldo, 1990, p.45).  It should be noted, however, that 
a ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental policy is quite a controversial idea with studies 
differing on if or when it occurs (Field & Olewiler, 1994; Markusen et al, 1995). 
A final, and very interesting, argument that has been gaining currency is the idea 
that the federal government needs the ability to honour its international obligations.  In the 
1950s, Canada had found itself in the embarrassing position of abstaining during a draft 
reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights before the United Nations, partly 
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because Ottawa did not want to appear to be encroaching on provincial jurisdiction 
(Schabas, 1998).  This issue became much more significant during the Free Trade 
negotiations, when the provinces demanded but did not receive ‘full participation’ in the 
negotiations (Delagran, 1992).  If the Kyoto Protocl is an indication of a trend towards a 
more global style of environmental governance, then this issue will only become more 
pressing. 
 Advocates of decentralization tend to focus on the benefits of diversity.  Thus, a 
decentralized federation can not only better accommdate different ethnic or linguistic 
groups who have their own regionally distinct prefences (Kincaid, 1996), but it can also 
experiment with policy innovation which can then be judged, at the most basic level, by 
citizens “voting with one’s feet” (Brander, 1985, p.37).  Vogel (1995) argues that such 
innovation, if undertaken by an influential enough jurisdiction, can actually lead to the 
opposite of the ‘race to the bottom’ – a phenomenon he refers to as the “California effect” 
(p.6), where other subnational or national actors are pressured to raise their regulatory 
standards.  Another argument which has been previously mentioned but is worth revisiting 
is that of efficiency.  As will become apparent, almost any argument in favour of 
decentralization is at least partially based on the assumption that there is needless overlap 
and duplication of effort, resulting in a great deal of inefficiency (Lindquist, 1999).  One 
might suggest that this overlap could equally be remedied by wide-scale centralization, but, 
in the context of Canadian environmental policy at le st, the dialogue of inefficiency – and 




 The seriousness of the problem of overlap is, not surprisingly, an extremely 
contentious issue.  As illustrated by Brown (1994), two reports, commissioned respectively 
by the governments of Quebec in 1978 and Alberta in 1992, discover a significant degree of 
overlap and attribute to it a high degree of inefficiency, while a study conducted by the 
Federal Treasury Board in 1991 finds that what overlap there is is managed fairly well.  
Perhaps the most insightful analysis of this situation comes from Meekison (1999), who 
states that “Disputes about overlap or duplication are inherently differences over the limits 
of jurisdiction” (p.69).   
2.3 Conclusion 
 
It is with these two debates in mind – collaboration versus competition and 
centralization versus decentralization – that the development of Canadian environmental 
impact assessment policy will be considered.  This research will focus on the possibility 
that federal unilateralism in the area of environmetal impact assessment has led at least 
partially to a corresponding increase in the level of stringency of provincial environmental 
impact assessment legislation and policy.  To do so, it is necessary to examine a period 
when the federal government was active in this policy area.  Environmental impact 
assessment is a useful area for this study because of it  relatively high public profile as well 
as the wide coverage of issues that an environmental assessment demands.  It is hoped that 
the results will cast some light on the validity of the arguments presented above in respect 






Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
 The following chapter outlines the approach and methods used to conduct this 
research.  The main components include an overview of the evaluative framework and a 
description of data sources.  Additionally, a brief description of jurisdictional selection 
criteria is included. 
3.1 Research Approach 
 
 This research adopted a historical analysis of the evolution of EIA processes at both 
the federal and provincial levels in order to compare nd contrast the changes at both levels 
over a given period of time.  The decade from 1985 to 1995 was the obvious choice given 
the number of reform processes initiated in this time.  These ten years also offered two 
unique factors that could be seen as catalysts for greater intergovernmental interaction: 
first, that public concern for the environment became exceptionally high by 1987 before 
returning to more normal levels by 1993; and second, that a series of court rulings 
effectively forced the federal government into a larger role in EIA.  Within this time-frame, 
the EIA processes of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and the 
federal government were examined.  The four western provinces were chosen because they 
had signed bilateral agreements with the federal government under the 1996 Canada-Wide 
Accord on Environmental Harmonization (CWA).  It was felt that the presence of these 
bilateral agreements indicated a deliberate attempt by the governments involved to come to 
terms with the increased federal involvement of the early 1990s.  While an examination of 
the harmonization initiative required a discussion of events after 1995, it was felt that such 
an examination provided the opportunity to better highlight the consequences of the 
 
 27 
legislative and policy developments discussed.  Ontario was also added to the analysis 
despite the fact that it does not have a bilateral agreement with the federal government 
(although one is currently in draft form) for its status as the third ‘have’ province in 
Canada.  It was hoped that the inclusion of Ontario would make any connection between 
greater provincial capacity to manage an EIA process and heightened intergovernmental 
tension more obvious. 
 It is worth elaborating on the decision not to include Quebec in this analysis.  
Indeed, at first glance this would seem an illogical decision given the argument that fear of 
federal intervention in provincial jurisdiction prov kes policy reforms.  Its longstanding 
calls for greater provincial autonomy seem to make Qu bec an ideal source of evidence for 
such a contention.  The decision was based on the fact that Quebec did not participate in 
most of the intergovernmental initiatives of the time.  It was the only Canadian jurisdiction 
not to sign onto the CWA and had no bilateral agreement with the federal government 
(although the Charest provincial government has very r cently signed such an agreement).  
Instead, Quebec continued to reject the idea that the federal government was a partner with 
significant responsibilities in EIA, even after the s ries of court cases in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s affirmed such a role.  It was felt that this different strategy would limit 
opportunities to examine the impacts of intergovernme tal interaction.   
 Before the harmonization agreements could be discussed, however, it was necessary 
to determine what exactly occurred in terms of EIA reform from 1985 to 1995.  Step one of 
the analysis, therefore, required the development of a framework to evaluate the degree of 
stringency of a jurisdiction’s EIA process.  Since significant debate surrounds the issue of 
what qualities are necessary for an effective process, cases where a comprehensive list of 
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such qualities was developed served as guidelines for the development of the seven factors 
used to assess stringency in this research.  The major such works this framework was based 
on were those of Gibson (1993) and Doyle and Sadler (1996).  Aboriginal involvement was 
not included amongst these seven factors, but, becaus  of its specific relevance to EIA in 
Canada, was noted for those processes where explicit provision for such involvement was 
made.  In each case, a jurisdiction’s process was assessed for each of these factors 
according to criteria drawn from the literature.  The various reforms that occurred 
throughout the decade - whether they be the development of policy guidelines, amendments 
to existing legislation or the introduction of new legislation - were also evaluated to create 
an idea of whether there had been an increase in stringency and where this increase 
occurred.  Table 3.1 provides a simple example of this by examining the evolving 
requirement for the consideration of alternatives under the Alberta EIA process. 
Table 3.1 EIA Processes in Alberta: 1985-1995 
 1973 Land Surface 





(3) Alternatives ○ 8(3) ● 49(h) 
 
Legend 
● Requirement to examine alternatives to project (including need for project) 
○ Requirement to examine alternative methods of imple enting project 
 
 
It should be noted that the symbols, which are displayed in the legend in order of 
decreasing stringency, mean different things in each category.  Where it was unclear where 
a process fell on this scale, a combination of two symbols was used. 
 In relation to the type of reforms made, this research accorded greater importance to 
changes in legislation than to changes in policy.  The latter was often guidelines developed 
by the Department or Ministry of the Environment listing the information required in an 
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EA.  As such, they certainly had the capability to alter the stringency level of the federal or 
provincial process.  However, a legislative requirement – either within the actual Act or in 
an accompanying regulation – seemed to guarantee mor consistency in application and 
clearer ties to offence and enforcement provisions.  Where applicable, then, mention was 
made of the relevant guideline but the evaluation of stringency was based more on the 
legislation and its regulations. 
 Step two of the analysis was aimed at clarifying the impact of federalism on 
EIA policy in the chosen jurisdictions.  To do this, the court cases concerning the Rafferty-
Alameda dams, the Oldman River dam and the James Bay II hydroelectric project were 
examined to help understand the reasons for greater fed ral involvement in EIA in the 
1990s and to identify key areas that were seen as ineed of reform at the time.  Two types 
of consequences of this involvement were then sought: changes in federal and provincial 
attitudes at the multilateral level – meaning changes in terms of attitude towards 
intergovernmental agreements – and changes in the individual provincial EIA processes 
that could be related to federal reforms.  Commonalities between the provincial responses 
were obviously emphasized, but it was also deemed important to identify where the 
provincial positions diverged.  Similarly, the federal and provincial positions were also 
contrasted.  Finally, as a possible counter-argument to the hypothesis, public opinion data 
was analyzed to determine whether those reforms undertaken during this period could be 
convincingly attributed solely to increased public concern.  The research questions behind 





Table 3.2: Research Questions 
Broad Question Sub-Questions 
Was there a widespread movement towards 
EIA reform in Canada from 1985 to 1995? 
• Which jurisdictions had a more 
stringent EIA process in 1995 than a 
decade earlier? 
• Were there specific areas of the EIA 
process that received attention from 
many or all of the chosen jurisdictions? 
• Were the majority of EIA reforms 
initiated when public concern was 
trending upward or at its peak?   
• Were any reforms initiated when public 
concern was trending downward or after 
it had returned to normal levels?   
Was there an increased federal presence in 
EIA during this period? 
• Did the court cases around 1990 result 
in a change in the intergovernmental 
method of addressing EAs where both 
orders of government were involved?   
• What were the federal and provincial 
responses to this change?   
Can an increased federal presence in EIA be 
considered an important factor in provincial 
reforms during this period? 
• Was there a noticeable linking on the 
part of the provinces between increased 
stringency in EIA processes and a more 
limited federal role? 
• Was there variation in responses across 
the provinces? 
 
3.2 Data Sources 
 
 Sources used differed significantly between the two broad research questions 
presented above.  In determining the changes in EIA processes, the legislation or policies 
themselves were examined, along with relevant amendts or regulations.  Where 
possible, this was supplemented through Departmental or Ministerial guidelines.  Relevant 
literature was used to help devise appropriate critria upon which to base an evaluation as 
well as appropriate determinants of stringency.  Literature was also used to verify the 
accuracy of certain facts, but the ultimate assessmnt of stringency was done 
independently.  Data on public opinion trends was taken almost exclusively from Gallup 
Canada polls conducted between 1987 and 1992. 
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 Determining the impact of intergovernmental interaction on these reforms as well as 
the subsequent movement towards harmonization required a quite different set of evidence.  
The goal in this section was to examine a sufficient amount of evidence to be able to map 
out the evolution of intergovernmental relations in EIA since approximately 1990.  It was 
recognized that there were, if effect, two different levels at which impacts might be evident: 
the political and the practical.  Researching the former involved examining documentation 
surrounding relatively high-profile events, such as the construction of the Rafferty-
Alameda dams or the five-year review of the CEAAct.  Sources used included 
intergovernmental agreements, House of Commons committee hearings, court cases, 
provincial/territorial responses to proposed federal legislation, annual reports from the 
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, newspaper articles and academic 
literature.  This level of analysis served as an excellent reminder that environmental issues 
can only often be fully understood in the context of a jurisdiction’s larger political agenda 
because of its links to such factors as natural resource development. 
 Information at the practical level was gathered mainly through closer attention to 
the individual jurisdictions’ EIA processes.  The goal here was not only to gather more 
information from the perspective of the actual environmental assessment agencies, but also 
to gain a better understanding of specific details in the evolution of the processes.  This 
involved seven interviews with federal and provincial officials: one official from 
CEAAgency headquarters in Ottawa; a regional CEAAgency official in Edmonton; and one 
official from each of the selected provinces.  Intervi ws were conducted by telephone and 
lasted between 45 minutes and two hours.  Four officials were Director-level; two were 
Managers; and one chose to remain anonymous.  While the interview process introduced 
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the unavoidable problem of quotation selection bias, it was seen as an important means of 
understanding intergovernmental interaction in EIA as well as a way of clarifying the 
causal links between this interaction and policy outc mes.  This information was 
supplemented, where possible, by committee reports, annual Departmental or Ministerial 
reports and academic literature.  The practical level of analysis allowed for a much better 
understanding of the way EIA processes actually work in practice and made clear some 













Chapter 4: Evaluating Changes in Stringency of Cana dian 
Environmental Impact Assessment Legislation 
 
 This chapter serves as the first step of the evaluative framework introduced in the 
preceding chapter.  As such, the goal will be to identify and assess the significance of 
changes in stringency to the federal and provincial EIA processes from 1985-1995.  Section 
4.1 begins by presenting seven criteria for a stringent EIA process based on relevant 
literature.  Section 4.2 applies these criteria to relevant legislation and policy to each of the 
chosen jurisdictions.  Changes in legislation throughout the decade are contrasted in order 
to identify specific areas of increasing or decreasing tringency.  Section 4.3 concludes the 
chapter by commenting on the discernible patterns in process reform.  It is argued that there 
was an overall movement towards increasing stringency i  EIA processes at both the 
federal and provincial levels.  The most obvious common type of reform is measures taken 
to ensure adequate consideration of transboundary effects in an EA, but other areas that 
received attention in multiple jurisdictions were increasing public involvement and a 
greater commitment to sustainability.  This research also indicates a wide disparity between 
the degree of reforms across the examined jurisdictons.  Saskatchewan, Manitoba and 
Ontario undertook relatively few reforms and therefo  witnessed small increases in the 
stringency of their processes.  By contrast, the federal government, British Columbia and 






4.1 Environmental Impact Assessment Theory 
 
 EIA is a unique element of environmental policy.  Instead of establishing clear 
regulations concerning, for example, the emission of toxic substances, EIA serves as “…a 
vehicle for incorporating environmental considerations, along with conventional technical, 
financial and political considerations, in decisionmaking” (Gibson, 1993, p. 12).  Its goal, 
as defined by Lawrence (2003), is to “... determine[e] and manag[e] the potential impacts of 
proposed human actions and their alternatives on the environment” (p. 7).  How best to 
achieve this is a subject of significant controversy due to the obvious difficulty of providing 
not only a good analysis of the current environmental si uation but also attempting to judge 
the severity of the possible impacts of the proposed activity.  Nevertheless, since the 
emergence of EIA in the 1969 NEPA in the United States, some sort of agreement has 
gradually emerged over what the desirable qualities of EIA legislation are.   This has made 
it possible for some authors to seek to compare and co trast different EIA methods.  While 
each of these qualities shall be introduced below, the broader framework is largely based 
upon the work of Gibson (1993) and Doyle and Sadler (1996). 
(1) Commitment to Sustainability 
 “Sustainable development” remains a loaded term.  While the World Commission 
on Environment and Development (1987) defined it as “…development which meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs” (p. 43), it remains debatable what this means in practical terms or even whether 
completely sustainable development – where there is no long-term degradation to the 
environment - is possible.  A commitment to sustainab lity is, nevertheless, an important 
component in assessing the stringency of EIA legislation.  While one’s interpretation of a 
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jurisdiction’s success in meeting this standard will obviously vary depending on one’s 
definition of sustainability, Sadler (1996) offers perhaps the most realistic indicator: 
whether environmental goals are considered simultaneously with other elements such as 
economic and social goals.  This indicator can be int rpreted as having two elements.  First, 
as will become apparent, one of the major criticisms of EIA processes in the 1980s and 
early 1990s was that they were often undertaken belatedly after a significant amount of 
time and money had been devoted to a project, making it highly unlikely that a project 
would be stopped.  Second, it is increasingly seen as important that legislation ensure a 
proper scope for EIAs.  While this must be balanced against the need for an EIA process 
that is not so massive as to be unnecessarily obstructive, a broad definition of 
environmental effects which requires consideration of environmental, social, biophysical 
and other factors has come to be seen as an asset to EIA legislation (Sadar, 1996).   
 A second major element of a commitment to sustainabil ty is the need to address 
cumulative effects.  While this is once again a debat d concept, Rees (1995) identifies two 
core characteristics: first, a cumulative effects as essment (CEA) looks at the impacts of 
one factor or agent over time; and second, a CEA considers the impacts of other activities 
occurring in the same area.  Spaling and Smit (1995), meanwhile, identify three types of 
accumulation which a CEA should cover: temporal accumulation, which occurs when 
activities are undertaken too close together in time to allow the area affected to recover; 
spatial accumulation, which occurs when multiple activities are physically too close 
together than the distance required to offset some r all effects; and activity accumulation, 
which occurs when one activity is repeated many times.  As with a jurisdiction’s definition 
of environmental effects, there is a need for prope scoping of a CEA to prevent it from 
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becoming unmanageable.  However, it seems reasonable to expect that an explicit 
commitment to CEA would be present in stringent EIA legislation. 
(2) Coverage 
 A second important measurement of stringency lies in what exactly is subject to an 
EA under the legislation.  While EIA initially focused largely on physical works 
themselves, the realization that an EA’s effectiveness could be seriously compromised if it 
was not applied early in the process has led to more emphasis on its application in the 
planning stage.  The ideal would be strategic enviro mental assessment (SEA), in which a 
consideration of environmental impacts and alternatives to proposals is done at the policy 
level, making it less costly to alter or cancel theproject or activity (Noble, 2002).  In 
practice, however, SEA has run up against many problems, one of which is that 
policymakers are often reluctant to provide the necessary amount of transparency to ensure 
a SEA is occurring.  It shall therefore be considere  stringent if the extent of coverage in a 
piece of EIA legislation is broader than merely covering a physical work.  To do so, it must 
apply to not only ‘projects’ or ‘undertakings,’ but also related programs or plans. 
 Along with some sort of coverage of programs or plans, a stringent piece of EIA 
legislation should also be clear on when it applies.  Given the high degree of federal 
reticence to interpret the 1984 EARPGO as a binding commitment to conduct an EIA and 
corresponding attempts to avoid conducting them on key projects such as the Oldman River 
and Rafferty-Alameda dams, it is unsurprising that m ny analysts of EIA are suspicious of 
legislation that leaves application of an EIA to the discretion of a Minister or Director (see, 
for example, Doelle, 1993; Lindgren, 1999).  The ned for a clear ‘trigger’ mechanism is 
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often seen as a way to avoid the politicization of EIAs which may arise due to issues such 
as budget cuts or jurisdictional conflict.  
Industry leaders have also expressed a desire for clarity as to when EIA legislation 
applies, largely for two reasons.  First, there are many projects and activities small enough 
to merit a different process than a lengthy EA.  Under the Ontario EIA system, for example, 
smaller projects with potential impacts significant e ough to merit some sort of evaluation 
can be put through a class environmental assessment (Valiante, 1999).  Second, an unclear 
‘trigger’ can mean that a project or activity that is well underway may suddenly have to be 
put on hold while an EA is conducted because a governm nt has realized some aspect of 
the project or activity requires attention.  This was a frequent theme in federal committee 
hearings during development and review of the CEAAct and also in provincial arguments 
against a more assertive federal EIA role.  In both cases, the essence of the objections is 
that confusion over jurisdiction may lead to delay if one level of government (usually the 
federal government) joins the EIA process after the other level of government has already 
granted approval.  This is seen as especially frustrating if one EIA process has different 
requirements than another (Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable 
Development [SCOESD], Oct. 21st, 1997). 
(3) Alternatives 
 In a further effort to make sure that EIA acts less in a reactive manner and more as a 
genuine analysis of environmental impacts, a stringent process is now expected to require 
consideration of alternatives.  In the most stringent of cases, this would include not only 
alternative means of carrying out the proposed project or activity, but also alternatives to 
the project or activity itself.  Adherence to this latter point obviously involves something of 
 
 38 
a shift in traditional decision-making since environmental concerns must effectively be 
placed on par with financial and all other concerns.  Penney (1994) illustrates the contrast 
between these two models of decision-making in EIA and dubs them the “development” 
and “sustainability” paradigms.  While the former paradigm identifies possible 
environmental effects, the response is limited to mitigation of these effects rather than 
consideration of canceling the project or activity entirely.  An excellent example of this 
attitude is found in Alberta Attorney General Jim Horsman’s assertion in 1989 that, because 
the governments of Canada and Alberta had coordinated their EIA processes and jointly 
approved 46 projects, “…a perfect record was achieved in terms of environmental impact 
assessments” (Alberta Hansard, June 16th, 1989, p. 333).  This analysis does not consider 
whether potential impacts and alternatives were adequat ly discussed.  
 It is, of course, difficult to judge whether it isrealistic or desirable for EIA 
legislation to follow the “sustainability” paradigm completely.  Penney (1994), for instance, 
finds only some of the characteristics of this paradigm in the CEAAct.  Nevertheless, 
stringent EIA legislation should have some explicit requirement for an analysis of 
alternatives. 
(4) Decision-making 
 One of the main debates over the EIA process concerns who gets the final say.  In 
many ways, it makes sense for this decision to rest with the government Department or 
Ministry that is responsible for the proposed project or activity.  EIA, after all, is supposed 
to alter existing patterns of decision-making to incorporate environmental concerns as early 
as possible into planning.  The responsible governmnt authority should therefore, 
theoretically at least, be the best placed authority to judge whether these concerns are 
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significant enough to require mitigation or abandonme t of the proposal.  Gibson (1993), 
however, notes that “[EIAs] are an attack on the statu  quo.  Not surprisingly, then, 
voluntary adoption [of assessment requirements] has been rare and unreliable” (p. 17).  The 
possibility for a conflict of interest is heightened when the government Department (in 
Canada, only the federal government leaves final decision-making authority with the 
responsible authority) is also the proponent of the project or activity.  Gibson (1993) is 
once again skeptical of this arrangement: 
…proponents’ interests are inevitably limited.  As a result, it is usually necessary to give 
assessment review and final decisionmaking responsibility to independent authorities or at 
least authorities with a mandate that emphasizes environmental protection (p. 18). 
 
While the federal government still maintains that responsible authorities are best suited to 
conduct EIAs, for the purposes of this thesis EIA legislation that allocates decision-making 
authority to an independent authority will be seen as more stringent. 
 Another aspect of decision-making in an EIA process is the role of the review board 
or panel.  This is considered important as an area where experts and interested parties can 
review evidence presented and issue a recommendatio.  As will be seen, the majority of 
Canadian jurisdictions treat these recommendations as mainly advisory, but there is a 
movement towards endowing them with greater authority as well as making them more 
formal by establishing permanent committees with independent members.  These panels 
can also play an important role in ensuring the next criterion for stringency – perhaps the 
most controversial of any presented here – is met. 
(5) Public Involvement 
 On the surface, the need for public involvement in the EIA process seems obvious.  
The wider the range of people consulted, the more likely it is that all possible effects may 
be considered.  As Shepherd and Bowler (1997) state, public involvement ensures that the 
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goals and needs of the local citizens are expressed and that the project is ultimately better 
suited to the local environment.  This not only allows for an EIA that hopefully has more 
legitimacy in the eyes of citizens but also provides a forum for possible conflict resolution 
between opposing sides.  Exactly what form this involvement should take, however, is 
controversial.  While all Canadian jurisdictions now have some commitment to public 
involvement, an explicit requirement is less common.  Sinclair and Fitzpatrick (2002), for 
example, describe how the federal EIA process has four separate “tracks” for public 
participation – screenings, comprehensive studies, panel reviews and mediation - depending 
on the nature of the EIA being performed.  In the case of screenings, which deal with 
smaller projects and account for 99% of federal EIAs, public involvement is discretionary, 
while for the more rigorous comprehensive study, it is required, but only once the study 
report has been submitted.   
Indeed there are several criticisms of involving the public.  It can be expensive and 
time-consuming, especially if it results in a need to revise the project.  It may be seen as 
unnecessary considering the majority of people are probably not knowledgeable enough 
about the project or the environment to effectively weigh the costs and benefits of the 
proposal (Shepherd & Bowler, 2002).  And some debate how much it reduces conflict.  
Bérubé and Cusson (2002) argue that: “[t]oo often, ‘civil society,’ represented by 
environmental interest groups … focuses solely on adverse local impacts” (p. 1296).  For 
the purposes of this research, however, it will be assumed that an explicit requirement for 
public involvement leads to more stringent EIA legislation. 
 It is also very important that the public be given access to the process early enough 
to have an impact on decision-making.  Smith (1982) identifies three levels at which 
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involvement can occur: the normative level, where th  planning for what should be done 
takes place; the strategic level, where it is decided what will be done; and the operational 
level, where it is decided how to do it.  As Shepherd and Bowler (2002) note, lack of early 
public involvement – before the operational level in the framework presented above – can 
lead to cynicism with the EIA process and a feeling that the only way to express 
reservations in a meaningful fashion is through a lega  challenge.  Sinclair and Doelle 
(2003) highlight several key points in ensuring timely public involvement, including the 
need for legislation to have access to information provisions that give early notice of the 
intended project to the public and provisions for public input in an EIA process such as a 
screening that does not involve a panel review or a public hearing.  EIA legislation can also 
limit public involvement by having a narrow definition of who needs to be consulted and 
by allowing information to be excluded from public consideration at the Minister’s 
discretion.  Although it is clearly quite complicated to evaluate which pieces of EIA 
legislation require early public involvement, some sort of attempt must be made.  EIA 
legislation that requires public input before the assessment document is submitted to the 
respective authority for approval shall therefore be interpreted as fulfilling the highest 
degree of stringency.  While this may seem too lenient an evaluation to some since it 
requires public consultation only at the operational level of a proposal, the comparative 
nature of this research makes it desirable that at least one jurisdiction meet the criteria laid 
out. 
(6) Implementation 
 No EIA process can truly be evaluated without considering its provisions for 
ensuring effective implementation of its decision.  Although it may seem simplistic to state 
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that EIA legislation must contain the ability to enforce the terms and conditions 
accompanying an approval, this has not necessarily been the rule across Canada.  For 
instance, the federal government, as previously mentioned, has consistently favoured 
leaving a great deal of the EIA process in the hands of the responsible authority.  This 
includes control over ensuring that any mitigation measures deemed appropriate are carried 
out.  Thus, there are no explicit offence provision in the CEAAct. 
 A related measurement of the stringency of an Act’s implementation provisions is 
the subject of effects and compliance monitoring.  Due to the wide range of subjects that 
might be dealt with in one EA and the need to predict the possible impacts of the proposed 
project over time, there is unavoidably an element of inexactitude in the findings.  It is 
therefore important to keep an eye on the situation even after the project is approved.  Sadar 
(1996) sees this monitoring as a means to “…verify the accuracy of impact predictions, 
establish what impacts actually occur, and to modify the mitigation measures to improve 
their effectiveness” (p. 108) and lays out a number of principles for effective monitoring, 
including having a clear system for funding these follow-up activities and ensuring that 
affected citizens have a role in deciding on any changes to be made.  Doyle and Sadler 
(1996), furthermore, divide monitoring into three categories in their evaluation: 
surveillance of construction of the project; the actu l monitoring of effects; and regular 
audits of approved projects.  Partially because Canad ’s governments score so poorly in the 
first and third categories, but also for the sake of simplicity, this research shall focus on the 
second category and use it as the only measure of monitoring.  Again, in order to be 




(7) Transboundary Provisions 
 Environmental impacts occur irrespective of political borders.  Kennett (1995) 
describes the growing recognition that EIA must operate along an ecosystem approach, 
which “…avoids imposing geographic constraints, arbitrary from an ecosystem perspective, 
on the review of environmental impacts” (p. 265), while also allowing for citizens outside 
the political jurisdiction within which the project is taking place to have a say.  In Canada, 
there has been conflict over the means for recognizing and addressing transboundary 
impacts.  First, the federal EIA process could be designed to trigger an EA if it is expected 
that significant transboundary effects could result from a proposed project.  As will be seen, 
however, such an arrangement has generated considerable provincial opposition.  Second, 
provincial EIA processes could allow for incorporation of extraterritorial concerns.  This 
latter arrangement seems to be the favoured approach in Canada, mainly through provisions 
allowing for either the opportunity for other jurisd ctions to have input into an EIA process, 
or for the harmonization of EIA processes in the evnt of multiple jurisdictions becoming 
involved.  While there is certainly a valid question as to whether these measures permit 
adequate representation of extraterritorial interests in a provincial EIA, it shall be assumed 
here that clauses permitting extraterritorial involvement and harmonization meet the criteria 
of stringency.  Having discussed the preceding seven qualities, it is now possible to apply 
them to Canadian EIA legislation between roughly 1985 and 1995.  In so doing, this 





4.2 The Development of Canadian EIA Legislation 
 
 Over the last 30 years, EIA legislation in Canada has developed in fits and starts.  
The first burst of interest in EIA came in the early 1970s after the passage of the NEPA in 
the United States.  Described by Doern and Conway (1994) as “…a sustainable-
development initiative long before its time” (p. 193), the NEPA, passed in 1970, met many 
of the criteria of stringency that many Canadian EIA processes were still falling short of 
two decades later.  For example, American agencies were required to consider ‘historical, 
cultural, economic, social and health effects’ along with environmental effects an EA could 
be conducted on legislative proposals and major programs along with specific projects.   A 
significant weakness of the NEPA, however, is often s en to be its allowance for judicial 
review, which Moffet (1994) argues is expensive, overly time-consuming and an 
unnecessarily confrontational method of dispute resolution.  While Shepherd and Bowler 
(1997) attribute this to inadequate opportunity for public involvement, Doern and Conway 
(1994) argue that the American example was interpreted by Canadian environmental 
policy-makers as a sign that an EIA process entrench d in law should be avoided until 
some solution to the unpredictability and expanse of l gal challenges could be found. 
 The first series of Canadian initiatives in EIA were therefore non-legislated 
processes that were largely non-binding in nature.  As previously discussed, this research 
focuses on the development of EIA processes at the fed ral level and in the five 
westernmost provinces.  Although two of these provinces had EIA legislation in place by 
1980, it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that comparable legislation was 
enacted across the remaining jurisdictions.  Each jurisdiction shall now be examined in 
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turn, with a focus on evaluating the stringency of EIA processes in place in the mid-1980s 
and comparing them with the EIA processes in place by the mid-1990s.  It will become 
apparent that there was a significant, widespread move ent towards increasing the 
stringency of these processes around the same time. Although the reasons for this rise will 
be analyzed in more detail in the following chapter, it is important to note that by the late 
1980s two fundamental changes were occurring in enviro mental policy: public concern for 
environmental protection was on the rise; and the fed ral government – partially against its 
will – was assuming a larger role in EIA in Canada. 
While arguments can be made that either one of these changes was responsible for 
the timing of the many process reforms, some aspect of the changes that occurred suggest 
the latter was preeminent.  Assuming that a Canada-wi e surge in public concern was the 
dominant factor, one might expect a fairly uniform upward movement, yet there is 
significant variation in the degree of change that occurred from one province to another.  
The one area in which there were significant changes in nearly all of the jurisdictions 
examined – transboundary provisions – was a necessary preliminary for the signing of 
agreements to harmonize EIA processes.  As Chapter 5 will discuss, a key provincial goal 
of these agreements was to deal with the problems presented by this new increased federal 
involvement. 
Throughout this chapter, a series of tables will be us d to illustrate the changes in 
jurisdictions’ EIA processes over the chosen period.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
symbols used are designed to represent the relative s ringency of the various chosen 
criteria.  The actual meaning of these symbols – described in the legend at the end of this 
chapter (page 68) – vary between criteria.  For example, the highest degree of stringency 
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for consideration of alternatives is not the same as the highest degree of stringency for 
enforcement and offence provisions, even though they would both be indicated by the same 
symbol.  The degrees of stringency within a given criterion would, however, be the same 
across jurisdictions.  Thus, two identical symbols indicating the stringency of the federal 
government’s and Alberta’s commitments to consider cumulative effects would have the 
same meaning.  The reader should keep in mind that the main purpose of presenting the 
data in this manner is to assess the significance of the changes within each jurisdiction and 
to identify common areas of improvement.  
4.2.1 Federal Government 
 
 Up until the ruling of the 1989 Federal Court of Canada ruling in the case of 
Canadian Wildlife Federation et al v Minister of the Environment and Saskatchewan Water 
Corporation, EAs were conducted on a discretionary basis at the federal level.  While the 
1987 Speech from the Throne had stated the government’s intention to introduce EIA 
legislation, the CEAAct would not be approved until 1992 and would not come into effect 
until 1995.  In the meantime, the EARPGO would suddenly assume a much greater role.  
This process had first been introduced in 1973 and was updated in 1977 and 1984; the latter 
time being when it was given Guidelines Order statu. 
 As illustrated by Table 4.1.1, there was an overall increase in the stringency of the 
federal EIA process from 1985 to 1995.  Whereas the EARPGO had a very weak 
commitment to sustainability, the 1995 CEAAct scored v ry high.  Although the EARPGO 
did mention that an assessment could include consideration of socio-economic effects, this 
would only occur at the discretion of the Minister of the Environment and the Minister of 
the initiating Department.  While the EARPGO scored slightly higher in terms of the 
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Table 4.1.1 EIA Processes at the Federal Level 
 1984 Environmental 
Assessment and Review 
Process Guidelines 
Order 
1995 Canadian Environmental 
Assessment  Act 
(1) Commitment to 
Sustainability 
  
Broad Definition of 
Environmental Effects 
x○ 4(2) ● 2(1) 
Cumulative Effects x ● 16(1(a)) 
(2) Scope of Act   
Extent of Coverage ○● 2 ○ 2(1) 
Size of Project ○●6 ● 5(1) 
(3) Alternatives x○ 12 ○● 16(1(e), 2(b)) 
(4) Decision-making   
Independent Authority ○ 12 ○ 20, 37 
Independent Review 
Panel or Board 




Required or Voluntary ○ 12(e) ● 4(d) 
Type of Involvement ○ 27(1) ○● 18(3), 19(2), 22, 35(3), 55 
(6) Implementation   
Enforcement and 
Offence Provisions 




x x○ 38 
(7) Transboundary 
Provisions 
○ 17 ● 4(c), 12(4), 40, 46, 54 
Aboriginal 
Involvement 
 10(1), 48 
 
extent of its coverage – defining “proposal” as “…any initiative, undertaking or activity for 
which the Government of Canada has a decision-making responsibility” [2] – this must be 
qualified by adding that Federal Departments did not expect to have to conduct an EA 
except when they chose.  Meanwhile, the CEAAct used a series of regulations to attempt to 
provide more clarity about what size project would have to undergo what type of EA.  The 
CEAAct was also much more explicit about its requirements for alternatives – both 
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concerning the different methods of conducting the project and about whether the project 
was necessary – while the EARPGO only required an ide t fication of adverse effects and 
whether they were mitigable.  The CEAAct scores slight y less than perfect, however, 
because consideration of alternatives is not explicitly mandatory in the case of screenings. 
 Possibly the most controversial aspect of the federal EA process – and one which 
the CEAAct continued – was the practice of leaving the decision-making largely in the 
hands of the Responsible Authority (RA).  While theMinister of the Environment would 
become involved if the RA decided a public hearing was necessary, the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency – previously the Federal Environmental Assessment 
Review Office – played mainly a supporting role of providing information to the RA.  The 
federal government has consistently argued that self-a sessment permits environmental 
concerns to be considered earlier on in the planning process.  Critics, however, express 
concern over the possibility of a conflict of interest, since the RA is also often the project 
proponent (Penney, 1994).  Apart from the possibility of a public hearing, the CEAAct 
contained many more assurances of public involvement than its predecessor.  Again, 
however, in the case of a screening these clauses are omewhat less stringent than in the 
case of a more rigorous comprehensive study.  The former requires that the RA “…[be] of 
the opinion that public participation in the screening of a project is appropriate in the 
circumstances…” [18(3)] if public comments are to be solicited. 
 While the EARPGO contained one reference to agreements with the provinces, 
territories or other countries, the CEAAct made extensive provision for them.  These 
included clauses ensuring that its requirements were not compromised by such an 
agreement and clauses for the consideration of “significant adverse environmental effects” 
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[46(1)] in another province by a mediator or review panel.  Furthermore, the CEAAct 
included substantial provisions asserting the federal right to conduct an EA if Aboriginals 
would possibly be affected.  Although this was not included as one of the criteria of 
stringency, it is an important aspect of what could be seen as the reasons for keeping the 
federal government involved in EIA. 
4.2.2 British Columbia 
 
 EIA in British Columbia was, until the passage of the Environmental Assessment 
Act in June 1995, conducted through non-legislated processes and a variety of Acts dealing 
with specific types of projects.  In 1976 the Guidelin s for Coal Development became the 
first process to lay out a procedure for environmental review of projects.  The Ministry of 
Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources published the Procedures for Obtaining Approval 
of Metal Mine Development in 1979 and these two review procedures were combined into 
the Mine Development Review Process in 1984.  The 1991 Mine Development Assessment 
Act formalized this procedure into the Mine Development Assessment Process.  The 1980 
Utilities Commission Act, meanwhile, established the Energy Project Review Process, 
which was also administered by the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources.  
And the 1981 Environmental Management Act made the first statutory reference to EIA and 
gave the Ministry of the Environment authority to require an environmental assessment.  
This wide-ranging but vague procedure eventually crystallized into the 1990 Major Project 
Review Process, which was jointly administered by the Ministries of Environment, Lands 
and Parks, and Employment and Investment. 
 In order to consolidate this somewhat scattered series of processes, the evolution of 
EIA in British Columbia shall be examined in three stages.  In the first stage, the processes 
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in place in 1985 will be evaluated.  These processes ar  the ability of the Environment 
Minister to order an environmental assessment under the Environmental Management Act, 
the Energy Project Review Process under the Utilities Commission Act, and the Mine 
Development Review Process.  The second stage shall evaluate those measures in place in 
1991 after the need for reform of the EIA process had become apparent, namely the Mine 
Development Assessment Act and the Major Project Review Process.  The third stage shall 
evaluate the Environmental Assessment Act. 
Stage One: 1985 
 As Table 4.2.1 shows, the EIA measures in place in 1985 were basic in nature.  The 
Environmental Management Act (EMA) was the first provincial statute to actually mention 
environmental assessment.  The Utilities Commission Act (UCA) and the Mine 
Development Review Process (MDRP), meanwhile, addressed EIA indirectly through  
licensing procedures for energy and mining projects, although the former required a 
surprisingly broad consideration of “…impacts by the project on the physical, biological 
and social environments” [Reg 388/80].  The EMA had the widest coverage of the three, 
permitting consideration of a “…work, undertaking, product use or resource use…” [4(1)] 
but was severely limited because its application was left entirely to the discretion of the 
Minister of the Environment.  This could not only lead to projects not being reviewed, but 
could also make it difficult for proponents to know whether or not they would have to 
perform an environmental assessment.  The UCA and the MDRP both relied on specific 
lists of projects to trigger an assessment, which were based largely on the size of the 
project.  All three processes had weak provisions for the consideration of alternatives, 
requiring proposals for mitigation of effects, but focusing mostly, as stated in the MDRP on 
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(1) Commitment to 
Sustainability 
   
Broad Definition of 
Environmental 
Effects 
○ 1(2) ● Reg 388/80 ○● 
Cumulative Effects x x x 
(2) Scope of Act    
Extent of Coverage ○ 4(1)  ○ 16 ○ 
Size of Project x 3  ○ 16 ○ 
(3) Alternatives x○ Reg 330/81 x○ Reg 388/80 x○ 
(4) Decision-
making 
   
Independent 
Authority 
● 3 ○ 21 ○ 
Independent Review 
Panel or Board 
x○ 11 ○ 19(1) x○ 
(5) Public 
Participation 
   
Required or 
Voluntary 
x ○ Reg. 388/80 ● 
Early Involvement x x○ 20(1) ○ 
(6) Implementation    
Enforcement and 
Offence Provisions 




x x, ○ Reg 144/91 x 
(7) Transboundary 
Provisions 
x x x 
 
whether “…project benefits [are] sufficient to outweigh major social or environmental 
impacts” (MDRP).   
 In terms of decision-making, the EMA was the only process administered by the 
Ministry of the Environment.  The final decision under the UCA and the MDRP rested with 
the provincial Cabinet.  As previously discussed, such a scenario often results in the 
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Minister of the Environment confronting several other Ministers responsible for economic 
development.  In this case, where both processes were administered by the Ministry of 
Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, the Environment Ministry was not involved until 
the approval stage.  At this late stage, it would seem that a call for further study would be 
often seen as unnecessary delay.  Furthermore, while assessments under the UCA could 
involve input from the Commission for Public Utilities, it was subject to Ministerial 
discretion.  The EMA established an Environmental Appeal Board, but did not link it to 
environmental assessments, while the MDRP allowed for referral of an application to the 
Mine Development Steering Committee, which was within t e Ministry of Energy, Mines 
and Petroleum Resources. 
 Clauses for public participation were fairly limited in all three processes.  The EMA 
contained no references to it, the UCA required a description of public information and 
consultation measures undertaken and that the hearings of the Commission for Public 
Utilities be open to the public, and the MDRP required distribution of the project 
prospectus to local actors such as Native groups as well as information on “…the reaction 
of the public at large to project proposals” (MDRP).  Each process was also weak in terms 
of implementation.  The EMA was the only one to have explicit enforcement and offence 
provisions, while effects and compliance monitoring was non-existent across the three 
processes until the passage of Regulation 144/91. 
Stage Two: 1991 
 By the time this Regulation was passed, the EIA processes in all of the jurisdictions 
examined here were undergoing reform or review.  In British Columbia, two new processes 
emerged: the Major Project Review Process (MPRP) and the Mine Development 
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Assessment Act (MDAA).  These processes, illustrated in Table 4.2.2, demonstrated an 
increased emphasis on public involvement and saw the beginning of transboundary 
involvement, although they essentially served as stopgap measures until the Environmental 
Assessment Act became law.  The MDAA, for instance, never had anyccompanying 
regulations passed. 
 Both processes required an analysis that went beyond purely biophysical effects.  
The MDAA, however, did not explicitly define environmental effects.  A commitment to 
early examination of “socio-economic and community impacts” was merely laid out as an  
objective of the legislation.  As in the 1985 process s, both the MPRP and the MDAA 
limited their applicability to projects over a certain size.  And while the MPRP required 
description of “environmental management during construction and operation,” the MDAA 
limited discussion of alternatives to a consideration of impact mitigation. 
 In terms of decision-making, both processes continued to rely on joint responsibility 
between either the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petrol um Resources in the case of the 
MDAA, or the Ministry of Development, Trade and Tourism in the case of the MPRP, and 
the Ministry of the Environment.  Both processes alo provided for the appointment of 
independent review panels which made recommendations to the decision-making 
authorities, although appointment of a panel was still left to Ministerial discretion.  This 
was a slight drawback for the MDAA in terms of stringency, since the panel review was the 
major mechanism for public involvement.  By contrast, the MPRP listed public 
involvement as one of its main objectives and required public information meetings and 




Table 4.2.2 EIA Processes in British Columbia: 1991 
 1991 Mine Development 
Assessment Act 
1990 Major Project Review 
Process 
(1) Commitment to 
Sustainability 
  
Broad Definition of 
Environmental Effects 
○● ●  
Cumulative Effects x x 
(2) Scope of Act   
Extent of Coverage ○ 1(1)  ○  
Size of Project ○ 1(1) ○  
(3) Alternatives x○ ○  
(4) Decision-making   
Independent Authority ○ 3(1(b))  ○  
Independent Review 
Panel or Board 




Required or Voluntary ○● 2(4(b(i))) ●  
Early Involvement ○ ●  
(6) Implementation   
Enforcement and 
Offence Provisions 







○ 8 ● 
 
Significantly, it made specific mention of the need to provide notice and information to 
local Native groups. 
 The MPRP once again demonstrates the major weakness of a non-legislated 
program due to its lack of enforcement and offence provisions.  Although the MDAA had 
enforcement provisions, it did not detail the specific monetary penalties an offender would 
incur.  Both processes were notable, however, for their inclusion of mechanisms to deal 
with transboundary effects.  While the MDAA authorized the Minister to enter into 
agreements with other jurisdictions, the Major Project Steering Committee, which 
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administered the MPRP, included representatives from both the Federal Environmental 
Assessment and Review Office and Environment Canada. 
Stage Three: 1995 
 The 1995 British Columbia Environmental Assessment Act (BCEAA) was, 
according to this set of criteria, likely the most stringent piece of EIA legislation in Canada.  
While subsequent amendments have dismayed some environmentalists due to a perceived 
weakening in areas such as what automatically trigge s an environmental assessment (see, 
for example, Sumi & Young, 1998), the upward jump in stringency from the processes in 
place in 1991 to the BCEAA is remarkable.  Not only did the latter require consideration of 
“…environmental, economic, social, cultural, heritage and health effects…” [2(b)], but, for 
the first time in British Columbia, some attempt was made to judge the probable cumulative 
effects of the project.  The Act applied to proposals for “projects,” but also to modification 
or abandonment of a project as well as “any activities related to the project…” [1].  Like its 
predecessors, the 1995 BCEAA was triggered by a list of projects, but also allowed for 
designation of a project as reviewable.  Consideration of alternatives, while not attaining 
the uppermost level of stringency, was explicitly required. 
 While the ultimate decision still lay with the Lieutenant Governor in Council and 
the approval of the responsible Minister (i.e. the Minister responsible for the specific type 
of project being evaluated) along with the Minister of Sustainable Resource Management 
and Water, Land and Air Protection was still necessary, environmental assessments were 
now coordinated by the independent Environmental Asses ment Office.  Furthermore, 
while referrals to the Environmental Assessment Board remained at the Ministers’ 
discretion, hearings were required to be public and ppointees were to be chosen based on  
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Table 3.2.3 EIA Processes in British Columbia: 1995 
 1995 Environmental Assessment  Act 
(1) Commitment to 
Sustainability 
 
Broad Definition of 
Environmental Effects 
● 1, 2(b) 
Cumulative Effects ● 22(j) 
(2) Scope of Act  
Extent of Coverage ● 1 
Size of Project ○ 4, Reg 276/95 
(3) Alternatives ○ 22(e) 
(4) Decision-making  
Independent Authority ○● 20, 30, 34 
Independent Review Panel or 
Board 
 ○● 30, 48 
(5) Public Participation  
Required or Voluntary ● 14 
Type of Involvement ● 16(1), 52 
(6) Implementation  
Enforcement and Offence 
Provisions 
● 71, 76(2), 78 
Effects and Compliance 
Monitoring 
● 38(1) 
(7) Transboundary Provisions ● 7(2(m)), 9(2), 22(k), 86, 87 
Aboriginal Involvement 7(2(k)), 87.1 
 
expertise in the anticipated effects of the project.  Another significant change which 
deserves mentioning is that project proponents could be ordered to pay for the hearing’s 
costs, helping to ensure some degree of intervenor funding.  The Act also contained 
extensive enforcement and offence provisions and broke new ground by incorporating 
provisions allowing for effects and compliance monit ring.  This included not only 
monitoring of mitigation requirements, but also comparing anticipated effects with actual 
effects.  
 Following the trend started by the 1991 EIA processes, the 1995 BCEAA contained 
extensive transboundary provisions requiring measures such as inclusion of representatives 
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from other jurisdictions on committees and permitting modification of the Act’s processes 
to allow for the proper functioning of an agreement with another jurisdiction.  
Representatives of affected First Nations were alsoto be included on committees and the 




 EIA in Alberta, like that of its western neighbour, involved a complicated series of 
Acts until the passage of one consolidated Act in the early 1990s.  Unlike, British 
Columbia, however, Alberta relied on a single piece of legislation – the 1973 Land Surface 
Conservation and Reclamation Act (LSCRA) – for the actual EIA process.  Approval by 
the Minister of the Environment under the LSCRA was al o only one step for a project 
proponent, since it was also necessary to gain other permits under resource-specific Acts 
such as the 1975 Water Resources Act, under which the Oldman River dam was licensed, as 
well as under environmental Acts such as the 1971 Clean Water Act.  The 1992 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act (EPEA) would in fact encompass seven 
Acts of the latter variety.  For the purposes of this research, however, only the EIA process 
prior to 1992 – namely, the LSCRA, supplemented by Alberta Environment’s 
Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines (1985) - shall be compared with the EPEA. 
 What emerges from this analysis is the transition fr m a lacklustre EIA process with 
a very limited legislative base into one of the most stringent of those discussed.  As 
illustrated by Table 4.3.1, the LSCRA had a much weaker commitment to sustainability, 
with only the Guidelines stating that effects on social, economic and cultural conditions 
were “normally” addressed.  The scope of both Acts s ores the same on this scale, although  
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Table 4.3.1 EIA Processes in Alberta: 1985-1995 






(1) Commitment to 
Sustainability 
  
Broad Definition of 
Environmental Effects 
○ 8(1) ● 49(d) 
Cumulative Effects x ● 49(d) 
(2) Scope of Act   
Extent of Coverage ○ 8(1) ○ 39(e) 
Size of Project ○ Reg 125/74, 228/82 ○ Reg 111/93, 211/96 
(3) Alternatives ○ 8(3) ● 49(h) 
(4) Decision-making   




Panel or Board 
x○ Reg 125/74 ● 90, 98(2)  
(5) Public Participation   
Required or Voluntary ○ ○● 40(d), 95(2) 
Early Involvement x ○ 44(6), 49(l), 91(1(i)), 
103 
(6) Implementation   
Enforcement and 
Offence Provisions 
● 8(6), 9, 18 ● 227, 228 
Effects and Compliance 
Monitoring 
x ○● 49(i) 
(7) Transboundary 
Provisions 
x ● 19, 57 
 
the EPEA deals with “activities” instead of “developments,” and both rely on lists of 
regulated activities or developments, with EPEA’s lists being more comprehensive.  EPEA 
also contains much more stringent clauses concerning alternatives, requiring “a 
consideration of the alternatives to the proposed activity, including the alternative of not 
proceeding with the proposed activity” [49(h)], while the LSCRA included only the 
possibility that the Minister might require consideration of alternative means of 
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construction.  The Guidelines helped somewhat by stating that a report should include 
proposals to avoid adverse effects. 
 The EPEA continues to outperform its predecessor throughout the remaining 
sections.  While both Acts give final decision-making authority to the Minister of the 
Environment, the EPEA establishes the Environmental Appeal Board, which may reverse 
initial decisions taken by the Director in charge of EAs.  The LSCRA, meanwhile, 
established several committees, but they were mainly fora for interministerial collaboration.  
Both Acts also provide for referral of an EA concerning related material to committees 
established under other legislation, such as the Energy Resources Conservation Board or 
the Natural Resources Conservation Board, where there will be a public hearing.  Apart 
from this, however, public participation stands outas a weaker  area of EIA in Alberta.  The 
LSRA did not mention involving the public, while the Environment Ministry’s Guidelines 
only added that “[p]roponents are encouraged to let th  public review the EIA before 
submitting it to Alberta Environment” (p. 7).  Though the EPEA is a significant 
improvement, it does not match the rigour of some of its 1995 counterparts in ensuring 
early dissemination of information.  And while there are means to contest rulings, a citizen 
must be considered to be “…directly affected by a proposed activity…” [44(6)] to submit a 
statement of concern.  This weakness does not extend to implementation, where the EPEA 
contains provisions requiring the proponent to submit plans for monitoring impacts.  Unlike 
the LSRA, the EPEA also contains transboundary provisi ns which allow the Minister to 
enter into agreements with other jurisdictions on “…any matter pertaining to the 






 Saskatchewan developed one of the earliest pieces of EIA legislation in Canada.  
After operating through an Environmental Impact Assessment Policy for four years, the  
Saskatchewan Environmental Assessment Act (SEAA), passed in 1980, remains the means 
through which EAs are conducted.  While the Saskatchewan Environmental Assessment 
Review Commission (1991) undertook a review of the EIA process in 1990 that made 
significant recommendations including earlier public involvement, increased harmonization 
with other jurisdictions and policy-level EA, no amendments to the SEAA were made.  Nor 
have any accompanying regulations ever been passed.  The Saskatchewan Department of 
the Environment (SDOE) has, however, provided Guidelines for the Preparation of a 
Project Proposal (2003) which were developed in late 1986 and early 1987 during the 
creation of an EA for the Rafferty-Alameda dams.  The stringency of Saskatchewan’s EIA 
process, therefore, shall be judged on these guidelines as well as the 1980 SEAA. 
 The SEAA is comparable to those processes in place in 1985 in terms of stringency, 
but it does not fare so well when viewed alongside other Canadian EIA processes ten years 
later.  In relation to sustainability, the SEAA includes “…social, economic and cultural 
conditions…” [2(e)] that are related to biophysical matters such as air, land and water in its 
definition of “environment” but the SDOE Guidelines pay little attention to them.  The 
SEAA covers “developments,” which are projects or activities or alterations to them, and 
bases the trigger mechanism on whether a development ets any of six criteria.  While 
this may make it unclear for project proponents as to whether their development will 
require an EA, basing the trigger on whether an undertaking “substantially utilize[s] any 
provincial resource..,” “cause[s] widespread public concern because of potential  
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Table 4.4.1 EIA Processes in Saskatchewan 
 1980 Environmental Assessment Act 
(1) Commitment to 
Sustainability 
 
Broad Definition of 
Environmental Effects 
○● 2(e) 
Cumulative Effects x 
(2) Scope of Act  
Extent of Coverage ○ 2(d) 
Size of Project ● 2(d)  
(3) Alternatives ○ 
(4) Decision-making  
Independent Authority  ● 2(g), 15  
Independent Review Panel or 
Board 
x○ 5(d), 14  
(5) Public Participation  
Required or Voluntary ○● 11(2), 13 
Early Involvement x○ 11(2), 13  
(6) Implementation  
Enforcement and Offence 
Provisions 
● 20, 21 
Effects and Compliance 
Monitoring 
x○ 
(7) Transboundary Provisions ○ 5(f) 
 
environmental changes,” or “ha[s] a significant impact on the environment…” [2(d)], it 
avoids the possibility that a variety of projects will not be subject to an EA because of their 
exclusion from a specific list.  The need to discus alternatives is mentioned only in the 
SDOE Guidelines, not in the actual legislation. 
The SEAA’s scores vary across the remaining sections.  Saskatchewan was one of 
the first jurisdictions, for example, to give decision-making authority to the Minister of the 
Environment alone.  The forming of a review panel or b ard is entirely at the Minister’s 
discretion, as are its terms of reference.  The Rafferty-Alameda board of inquiry was the 
first created under SEAA, seven years after it became law.  The need for public information 
meetings is also at the Minister’s discretion, although the SDOE Guidelines require the 
 
 62 
proponent to document its public participation program.  This publication of reasons for not 
requiring an EA, but these changes are not reflected in the table.  The SEAA does contain 
enforcement and offence provisions, but requirements for effects and compliance 
monitoring are limited to the SDOE Guidelines, which ask only that “…contingency plans 
and monitoring programs … be outlined” (p. 3).  The SEAA also provides for agreements 




 The Manitoba Environment Act (MEA) was passed in mid-1987 and proclaimed 
into force in early 1988 and, as such, may be considered the first piece of legislation aimed 
strictly at the EIA process to come into being during the 1985-1995 period.  It underwent 
only one amendment significant to this research during this period, although two 
accompanying regulations will be noted.  The MEA was b sed on a 1975 Cabinet Directive 
which established a provincial Environmental Assessment Review Policy, but considering 
how early it was passed, the evaluation of the stringency of Manitoba’s EIA process shall 
be based exclusively on the legislation. 
 The MEA scores very highly in terms of stringency when compared to the other 
processes in place in the late 1980s and also fares reasonably well alongside the processes 
in 1995.  Not only does it require consideration of “…social, economic, environmental, 
health and cultural conditions…” [1(2)] but it also alludes to cumulative effects.  The Act 
covers “developments,” which means “… any project, industry, operation or activity” 
[1(2)] and relies on an extensive list to determine whether a development is subject to an 
EA.  Manitoba has a unique ‘class’ system for its EAs in which developments are divided  
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Table 4.5.1 EIA Processes in Manitoba 
 1987 Environment  Act 
(1) Commitment to 
Sustainability 
 
Broad Definition of 
Environmental Effects 
● 1(2) 
Cumulative Effects ○ 1(2) 
(2) Scope of Act  
Extent of Coverage ○ 1(2) 
Size of Project ○ Reg 164/88  
(3) Alternatives  x○ 11(9c), 12(5c) 
(4) Decision-making  
Independent Authority ● 10(8), 11(11), 12(7)  
Independent Review Panel or 
Board 
○● 6(1)  
(5) Public Participation  
Required or Voluntary ● 10(4), 11(8), 12(4) 
Early Involvement ● 10(7), 11(10), 12(6)  
(6) Implementation  
Enforcement and Offence 
Provisions 
● 31, 33 
Effects and Compliance 
Monitoring 
x 
(7) Transboundary Provisions ● 13.1 [1991], Reg 126/91 
 
into three categories, with those with potentially wide-ranging impacts subject to a different 
process.  These variations, where relevant, shall be mentioned.  In terms of alternatives, for 
instance, classes two and three contain clauses stating he director or Minister respectively 
“may” require consideration of different ways to carry out the development, while class one 
contains no reference to alternatives at all. 
 The MEA scores fairly highly in the remaining crite a.  Decision-making authority 
rests exclusively with the Department of the Environment and the Clean Air Commission, 
established under the legislation, can be called upon to give recommendations and to 
coordinate public involvement.  While these public hearings are at the director’s or 
Minister’s discretion, the project proposals for all three classes are  also made public after 
 
 64 
they are received and opportunity for comment and objection must be provided.  
Enforcement and offence provisions are quite stringent, although effects and compliance 
provisions are lacking. 
 Manitoba’s transboundary EIA provisions and accompanying Joint Environmental 
Assessment Regulation were passed in 1990/91 and are the efore of more interest to this 
research.  These provisions allow the Minister of the Environment to either authorize a joint 
EA or to submit to the other jurisdiction’s EIA process.  The Minister must be satisfied that 
the other process is at least equivalent to Manitoba’s and public hearings in the province 
must be held.   
4.2.6 Ontario 
 
 The 1975 Ontario Environmental Assessment Act (OEAA) was remarkable not only 
for the fact that it was passed at such an early date, but also because it was such a strong 
piece of EIA legislation.  Like all of the other jurisdictions discussed here, Ontario’s 
process underwent a significant review beginning in the late 1980s.  Many of the ensuing 
recommendations from Ontario Environment’s (1990) report were in some stage of 
implementation when the incumbent NDP government was defeated in the 1995 election.  
The new Progressive Conservative government changed paths somewhat, deciding to focus 
on increasing efficiency and reducing delays and passed a new Act in 1996.  Given this late 
date but also the fact that the focus of the new Act did not really stem from the 1990 report, 
the evaluation of Ontario’s EIA process from 1985-1995 shall be based on only the 1975 
Act and its related amendments and regulation. 
Ontario’s high score on these criteria helps to illustrate that many of the reforms 
other governments adopted around 1990 were already considered policy options in the early  
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Table 4.6.1 EIA Processes in Ontario 
 1975 Environmental Assessment  Act 
(1) Commitment to 
Sustainability 
 
Broad Definition of 
Environmental Effects 
● 1(c) 
Cumulative Effects x 
(2) Scope of Act  
Extent of Coverage ● 1(o), 17 
Size of Project ● 3* 
 x 3(c)** [RSO 1990] 
(3) Alternatives ● 5(3(b)(c))  
(4) Decision-making  
Independent Authority ● 1(f), 14 
Independent Review Panel or 
Board 
○● 18, 24  
(5) Public Participation  
Required or Voluntary ○● 7(1)(2), 19 
Early Involvement ○ 19  
(6) Implementation  
Enforcement and Offence 
Provisions 
● 29, 40 
Effects and Compliance 
Monitoring 
○ 14(b(iii)) 
(7) Transboundary Provisions ○ 18.1 [1994] 
* Applies only to public undertakings 
** Applies to private undertakings 
 
1970s.  While cumulative effects assessments were larg ly things of the future, the OEAA 
included “social, economic and cultural conditions” in its definition of “environment” 
[1(c)].  The Act’s coverage extended to “undertakings,” which included “an enterprise or 
activity or a proposal, plan or program in respect of an enterprise or activity…” (1[o]) as 
well as changes to undertakings.  The size of the project, however, was one of the more 
criticized elements of the OEAA, since initially the legislation only applied to public 
undertakings.  While it was later amended to allow the Minister to require EAs of private 
undertakings when necessary, this was hardly a stringent or predictable trigger.  In contrast 
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to this weakness, the Act required consideration of alternatives to the undertaking itself 
almost 20 years before any other EIA process examined here would. 
The remaining clauses were consistently stronger than ose in other Canadian EIA 
processes at the time.  Not only was the Minister of the Environment designated as the final 
decision-making authority, but an independent Environmental Assessment Board was 
established which conducted public hearings and whose decision could only be overturned 
by the Minister for 28 days after it was decided.  Public involvement clauses existed, but 
allowed the public access only after an EA was submitted to the Environment Ministry.  
Any person could, however, require a hearing by the Environmental Assessment Board.  In 
addition to enforcement and offence provisions, furthermore, the OEAA gave the Minister 
authority to require monitoring programs and reports.  And finally, the Act was amended in 
1994 to allow the Board to sit jointly with “…any tribunal established under the law of 
another jurisdiction” [18.1]. 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
 What emerges from this analysis is that, essentially over a period of five years, the 
EIA processes of the jurisdictions examined underwent significant review and notable – 
though uneven – reform.  In Saskatchewan, such a review produced dozens of 
recommendations yet made very little impact in the actual EIA process, which instead 
evolved throughout the 1990s via policy changes within the Department of the 
Environment.  Manitoba, which only established a legislated EIA process in 1987, likewise 
made very few changes in the following years.  Ontario made minor changes to its coverage 
of private undertakings, but, despite a major review, did not produce a reformed Act until 
1995, when a change in government also resulted in a change in focus.  British Columbia 
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and Alberta, meanwhile, revolutionized their EIA processes, not only through dramatic 
overall increases in stringency, but also through commitments to newly emerging areas 
such as CEAs and effects and compliance monitoring. 
 The most significant change in an EIA process, however, occurred at the federal 
level.  Not only did the federal government become legally obligated to perform EAs on a 
wide variety of projects, but the subsequent development of the CEAA resulted in a much 
more stringent process than had existed under the EARPGO.  This increase in stringency is 
evident across all the criteria presented in the preceding chapter, with the exception of 
decision-making, which remained the same.  In terms of intergovernmental interaction, 
therefore, these changes meant that the provinces were now faced with widespread federal 
involvement in areas where there had been little before, with federal Departments operating 
according to legislation which had more demanding iformation requirements than its 
predecessor.  Of special interest in this regard is the development of transboundary 
provisions; the only one of the seven criteria for stringency where there was a near-
unanimous upward trend across the jurisdictions examined.  As will be discussed in the 
following chapter, the need for such provisions was one of the key issues in the Rafferty-
Alameda court decisions and was necessary in facilitating the movement towards the 









(1) Commitment to Sustainability  
Broad Definition of Environmental Effects ● Biophysical, socio-economic, cultural 
○ Biophysical and its effects 
Cumulative Effects ● Explicit requirement 
○ Implied or guideline basis 
x Not required 
(2) Scope of Act  
Extent of Coverage ● Projects, activities, programs, plans 
○ Projects, activities 
Size of Project ● Major and minor impacts, large and small 
projects 
○ Specific list of projects 
x Major projects or Ministerial discretion 
(3) Alternatives ● Requirement to examine alternatives to 
project (including need for project) 
○ Requirement to examine alternative 
methods of implementing project 
(4) Decision-making  
Independent Authority ● Decision by independent authority 
○ Decision by responsible authority 
Independent Review Panel or Board ● Independent review panel with binding 
decision-making authority 
○ Independent review panel with advisory 
role 
x No independent review panel 
(5) Public Participation  
Required or Voluntary ● Statutory requirement 
○ Voluntary and suggested in guidelines 
Type of Involvement ● Public comments sought during process 
○ Proceedings open to public comment 
x Documents released after decision 
(6) Implementation  
Enforceable Conditions ● Explicit approval and offense provisions 
○ Enforcement under other regulations 
x No enforcement provisions 
Effects & Compliance Monitoring ● Monitoring of implementation of 
conditions or period audits and monitoring 
of post-approval effects 
○ Monitoring of post-approval effects 
x No monitoring 
(7) Transboundary Provisions ● Allows input from affected jurisdictions 
and harmonization initiatives 
○ Allows harmonization initiatives 
x No provisions 
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Chapter 5: Federalism and Environmental Impact 
Assessment 
 
 Now that the specifics of when and how the EIA processes changed across the six 
jurisdictions examined here have been explored, it is possible to attempt some further 
analysis of how the interaction between the federal and provincial governments has affected 
the development of EIA policy in Canada.  This will require a consideration not only of 
events and agreements up until the coming into force f the CEAAct in 1995, but also of 
the movement towards harmonization that followed.  Section 5.1 will therefore examine the 
implications of the groundbreaking court rulings in the cases of the Rafferty-Alameda and 
Oldman River dams and the related consequences of the heightened federal involvement in 
EIA.  Section 5.2 will discuss the further development of the harmonization initiative 
through the failed Environmental Management Framework Agreement (EMFA), the CWA 
and the bilateral agreements associated with the later in order to paint a clearer picture of 
how the two orders of government interact.    Section 5.3 will offer relevant data on public 
opinion trends during these years and will attempt to reinforce the idea that 
intergovernmental considerations are a significant f ctor in explaining policy development.  
It will do so by building on the uneven degree of legislative and policy reform across the 
jurisdictions examined demonstrated in the previous chapter to show that the idea of six 
jurisdictions acting relatively independently of one another does not adequately explain all 
the evidence presented.  Section 5.4 will offer conclusions concerning the impact of 




5.1 Increased Federal Intervention 
 
 The key to examining the impact of federalism on the development of EIA policy 
since 1985 lies in the disruption of the traditional model of intergovernmental cooperation 
in EIA that existed before the late 1980s.  While th federal government had announced in 
the 1987 Speech from the Throne that the EARPGO would be replaced with a legislated 
EIA process, the emphasis in cases where both Ottawa and a province would be involved 
remained on what Kennett (2000) describes as process substitution.  This approach, 
illustrated well by the Canada-Alberta agreement (1986) which foreshadowed later 
intergovernmental agreements, was characterized by federal involvement in an EA only 
where there was, as Hodgins (1994) puts it: “…a clear and significant federal decision-
making authority, i.e. projects initiated by a department of the federal government, projects 
on federal lands and projects involving significant federal funding” (p. 13).   
Moreover, the main concern of the federal government at the time seems to have 
been “…reducing duplication of environmental assessment among federal and provincial 
agencies” (Environment Canada, 1987, p. 3).  Such a focus, already discussed somewhat, 
was also adopted later by the Chrétien government.  I  the context of intergovernmental 
relations, several authors find it unsurprising that federal governments – regardless of their 
political affiliation – would strive for harmony in this policy area in order to make gains in 
other areas of greater priority; Trudeau in energy policy, Mulroney in seeking a 
constitutional amendment, Chrétien in demonstrating o Quebec that federalism works 
(Skogstad, 1986; Doern & Conway, 1994).   
Beginning in 1989, however, a series of court rulings forced the federal government 
into a more assertive role.  These cases, involving the Rafferty-Alameda dams in 
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Saskatchewan and the Oldman River dam in Alberta, not o ly resulted in an interpretation 
of the federal EARPGO as a binding requirement to perform EAs in areas well beyond 
what had previously been considered to fall within t e Guidelines Order’s scope, but also 
exposed the important fact that provincial EAs were not taking into account certain 
elements that a federal EA should encompass.  In the following few years, the federal 
government would also suffer the embarrassment of having to conduct belated EAs even as 
the provinces refused to stop construction of the dams.  The ensuing CEAA, and the federal 
refusal to accede to unanimous provincial demands for equivalency agreements, were to a 
large part shaped by the fallout from these cases. 
5.1.1 The Rafferty-Alameda Dams 
 
The process of construction of the Rafferty and Alameda dams revealed significant 
shortcomings in both the federal and provincial EIA processes and generated significant 
intergovernmental tension.  As George Hood (1994) notes, Saskatchewan had neither 
devised any regulations for what was required in an EA nor ever formed a board of inquiry 
under its Environmental Assessment Act.  Hood, who worked exclusively on the Rafferty-
Alameda project from 1985 to 1991 as a high-ranking official in the Souris Basin 
Development Authority (SBDA), also details a conscious decision by the SBDA – the 
project proponent – to “…limit the involvement of the federal and Manitoba governments” 
(p. 66) for fear that the issue would get blown out f proportion.  While the Saskatchewan 
government reached an agreement with neighbouring North Dakota, this lack of attention to 
transboundary effects became one of the key criticisms of the federal absence in the EIA 
process.  In stark contrast to the idea presented above by the federal Department of the 
Environment only two years earlier that reduction of overlap of government processes was 
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of significant importance, the Federal Court in 1989 found that the federal and provincial 
processes and their requirements differed sufficiently to avoid unnecessary duplication 
(Canadian Wildlife Federation and others v Minister of the Environment and Saskatchewan 
Water Corporation (Rafferty No. 1) [1989]). 
It is perhaps worthwhile here to take a slight detour and elaborate on the growing 
recognition of the need for consideration of transboundary effects in EIA.  The potential 
significance of environmental effects in a neighbouring jurisdiction had been demonstrated 
by the 1967 W.A.C. Bennett dam in British Columbia, which had a variety of negative 
impacts in Alberta (Toronto Star, June 22nd, 1991).  While Kennett (1995) is critical of the 
ultimate decision to leave the formation of a federal mediation or panel review of 
transboundary effects to the discretion of the Minister of the Environment – the CEAAct 
gives the Minister authority to do this when “…[he or she] is of the opinion that the project 
may cause significant adverse environmental effects in another province” [46(1)] – it can 
be argued that the very presence of such a clause mak s it necessary for a province seeking 
to avoid federal involvement to pay some attention o eighbouring jurisdictions.  Raymond 
Robinson, Chairman of what was then the Federal Enviro mental Assessment Review 
Office (FEARO), describes such a situation to the House of Commons Special Committee 
formed to study the eventual CEAAct (Oct. 4th, 1990): 
…in the present circumstance there frankly is virtually no recourse for the citizens or 
persons living in one province against the impacts of another, or indeed the government of 
one province in dealing with that issue.  The federal government was anxious to establish a 
situation in which it could intervene in circumstances where those impacts would be likely 
to be serious … I will not deny the fact that certain provinces have been uneasy about what 
they see as an intrusion … But we feel that if that authority is effectively there, there is a 
high probability that it will rarely have to be used, that the pressure for the parties 
concerned to accommodate each other’s concerns will be considerable, since we have, as 





Indeed, a Saskatchewan official pointed to an element of truth in this argument by stating: 
“We like to deal with it amongst ourselves … the provinces … but [the federal 
transboundary provisions] are a nice backstop” (Lechn r, 2004).  Conversely, an Alberta 
official noted: “It’s in our best interests to deal with Saskatchewan one-on-one because they 
can petition the feds otherwise” (North, 2004). 
Returning to the Rafferty-Alameda case itself, the ruling also greatly broadened the 
triggers for federal intervention.  It was the positi n of the federal government that the 
EARPGO was a discretionary Order.  The rulings by the Federal Court and the Federal 
Court of Appeal (Canadian Wildlife Federation and others v Minister of the Environment 
and Saskatchewan Water Corporation (Rafferty No. 1) [1990]), however, interpreted the 
key use of the word “shall” as a binding commitment.  Such an interpretation of the 
EARPGO meant that federal EAs now had to be conducte  in any situation where, for 
example, “[a] proposal … may have an environmental effect on an area of federal 
responsibility” [(6)].  This was not seen as a negative development by all elements of the 
federal government.  Indeed, Raymond Robinson applauded the initial Federal Court 
decision, saying that the decision “…may turn us into a proactive agency instead of a 
passive agency” (Globe & Mail, April 17th, 1989).  And the Ministers of the Environment 
around this time, especially Jean Charest, subsequently asserted a stronger role than that 
traditionally adopted by the Department.  The federal government refused unanimous 
provincial demand for a clause in the CEAAct providing for equivalency agreements; a 




 The source of this unusual federal stance can be found in the difficult situation the 
Ottawa now found itself.  The provinces clearly resented the intrusion into areas of natural 
resource development by means of alternative elements of jurisdiction.  The Alberta 
Forestry Minister argued that: “We fought hard for c ntrol of the resources in this province, 
and we’re against the federal government coming into this process through the side door” 
(quoted in Harrison, 1996, p. 137).  Even in Saskatchewan, where an official noted that 
relations with the federal government are generally good, it was a concern that: “They gave 
away natural resources in the 1930s … over time it appears that they’re trying to find ways 
to get [them] back” (Lechner, 2004).  Yet public con ern for the environment was at a 
historic high, peaking in July 1989 when a Gallup Canada poll found it to be the issue of 
most concern to Canadians (Gallup Canada, July 31st, 1989).  A subsequent poll (Gallup 
Canada, August 3rd, 1989) reported that 82% of Canadians believed their governments were 
not doing enough to protect the environment.   
Given this heightened attention, any move by the fed ral government to back down 
could have resulted in significant political damage.  Speaking specifically of the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), an Alberta official noted that, after the 
Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman River court decisions, DFO had two choices: “…they could 
either amend the Fisheries Act to devolve responsibility or hire people to do the job.  So 
DFO got back in the habitat management business, becaus  at the time, devolution was 
probably politically a bad move” (North, 2004).  It was in this context that Lucien 
Bouchard, future founder of the Bloq Québécois, stated: “If there is a special role for the 
federal government, it is in the development of national environmental protection standards 
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and practices.  The very nature of environmental problems demands this” (quoted in 
Harrison, 1996, p. 121). 
 The conflict which followed the Rafferty-Alameda rulings between Saskatchewan 
and Ottawa also resulted in a fair amount of embarrassment for the federal government.  
After the initial federal licence under the International River Improvements Act was held up 
by the Federal Court pending an EA, Environment Canad  under Minister Bouchard 
produced and approved such a document without giving the public opportunity to review 
the final product.  A further court case resulted in a denunciation of this action, with Justice 
Muldoon writing: “If there be anyone who ought scrupulously to conform to the official 
duties which the law casts upon him or her in the rol of a high State official, it is a minister 
of the Crown” (Canadian Wildlife Federation and others v Minister of the Environment 
and Saskatchewan Water Corporation (Rafferty No. 2) [1990]).  The Court ordered that an 
Environmental Assessment Panel be formed, but did not quash the licence because so much 
construction had already occurred.  A subsequent agreement between the federal 
government and Saskatchewan to suspend construction fell apart after then-Environment 
Minister Robert de Cotret met with Premier Grant Devin  and apparently authorized the 
SBDA to continue work but then subsequently claimed h  did not (Hood, 1994).  Either 
way, the result was the resignation of the entire Environmental Assessment Panel and a 
perception in the national media that Devine was being allowed to “…thumb his nose at 
Ottawa” while de Cotret remained “powerless” to do anything about it (Toronto Star, Nov. 
17th, 1990).  Hazell (1998) sees Section 51 of the CEAAct, which authorizes the passing of 
an injunction to stop construction of a project when a panel is formed under the Act’s 
transboundary provisions, as a direct result of this incident.  This need for the EIA process 
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to begin before construction was further reinforced by the events unfolding in Alberta at 
around the same time. 
5.1.2 The Oldman River Dam 
 
 The legal and political disputes over the construction of the Oldman River dam in 
southern Alberta also resulted in significant federal-provincial tension, perhaps even greater 
than that produced in Saskatchewan because of Alberta’s t aditional sensitivity to perceived 
federal encroachment into natural resource policy and because this case was eventually 
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.  As previously mentioned, Alberta had an 
existing bilateral agreement with the federal government which essentially left the majority 
of EAs in the hands of the province.  This desire to maintain control over a process that 
could have a significant impact on natural resource development is reflected by 
comparisons of the proposed CEAAct to the National Energy Program (Alberta Report, 
Feb. 19th, 1990) and by assurances from political leaders such as Premier Don Getty that 
“…we will not, will not, allow our jurisdiction to be invaded” (Alberta Hansard, June 19th, 
1989).  Alberta argued unsuccessfully before the Court that the EARPGO was ultra vires 
and that the federal government should be constrained to examine only matters associated 
with the legislation under which a federal licence was granted – in this case the Navigable 
Waters Protection Act.  Tellingly, the federal government as a joint appellant and six other 
provinces as intervenors also supported the latter rgument.  One provincial argument 
eloquently stated that EAs were a “constitutional Trojan horse enabling the federal 
government, on the pretext of some narrow ground of federal jurisdiction, to conduct a far 
ranging inquiry into matters that are exclusively within provincial jurisdiction” (Friends of 
the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport) [1992]).  
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 The courts also rejected assertions that no federal EA was required because a 
provincial review had already been conducted.  Specifically, the Federal Court of Appeal 
ruled that the public had not been given the degree of opportunity for involvement in the 
process that a federal EA under the EARPGO would have allowed.  Nor were the review 
panels as independent (Friends of the Oldman River Society v Alberta (Minister of the 
Environment) [1988]).  While a variety of provincial studies conducted over the nearly 30 
years a dam had been considered on the Oldman Riverincluded some public input, the lack 
of a single EIA process meant that this input was often gathered in a far less formal and 
rigorous manner than would be the case under one single process.  And in some cases, as in 
the case of the issuing of the 1988 provincial licence under which the dam was eventually 
constructed, the requirements for public notice were waived altogether (Shpyth, 1991).  In 
fact, when then-Premier Peter Lougheed announced that the province would go ahead with 
construction, no requirement was made for any EA under the Land Surface and 
Reclamation Act at all (Edmonton Journal, Jan. 24th, 1992).  Project proponents merely 
argued that all of the studies previously conducted essentially amounted to an EA. 
 The presence of an Aboriginal reserve near the site of the dam seems a further 
strong basis for federal involvement.  The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs did 
encourage a study of the possible impacts on the res rv  and the province also provided 
funding to the Peigan tribe to conduct their own study of the possible effects of the 
construction (Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport) 
[1992]).  This did not, however, stop the federal Environmetal Assessment Panel – 
appointed in late 1990 – from harshly condemning the provincial process:  
The Peigan were not treated fairly in the decision-making, planning or implementation 
phases of this project.  The failure of the proponent and the Peigan to come to terms over 
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this project is one of the most significant and unacceptable features of the project (FEARO, 
1992, p. 5).   
 
Despite the provincial funding, several Aboriginal groups intervened before the Supreme 
Court in favour of greater federal involvement and, as the later discussion of the James Bay 
II project as well as the CEAAct will show, many groups have remained committed to this 
position.  Guarantees of Aboriginal involvement hold prominent positions in the CWA and 
its subsequent bilateral agreements and were generally cited as being of increasing concern 
by those officials interviewed.  A BC official described it as “…the most important issue in 
EA today” (Crook, 2004).  A CEAAgency regional official in Alberta noted a shift from the 
early 1990s when the provincial attitude was one of “Indian reserves are your problem … 
It’s federal jurisdiction” to a recognition after several lost court cases that Aboriginal 
involvement had to be improved (MacDonald, 2004). 
 Like its counterpart in Saskatchewan, the case of the Oldman River dam made clear 
the need for early application of the EIA process a well as the need for injunctions to stop 
construction.  By the time of the Supreme Court ruling, the dam was already complete and 
filled to 60% capacity (Edmonton Journal, Jan. 24th, 1992).  Despite this, the 
aforementioned federal EA Panel (1992) made the startling recommendation that the dam 
be decommissioned.  In addition to the lack of a formal EA and sufficient Aboriginal 
involvement, the Panel highlighted insufficient analysis of social and cultural impacts, lack 
of economic justification for the project and the fact that “…losses to the fishery resource 
caused by the project greatly outweigh any potential gains…” (p. 5) as reasons for their 
decision.  Recognizing that such a recommendation was probably unfeasible – Alberta 
Deputy Premier Jim Horsman, in his announcement that the province would boycott the 
federal EARP, stated: “I’d like to know how anybody short of Superman could shut down 
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the dam” (Toronto Star, July 16th, 1991) - the Panel urged that a series of mitigation 
measures be attached as conditions for the granting of a licence, with the threat that failure 
to comply would lead to decommissioning.   
Such a threat was hardly in accordance with the passive approach preferred by the 
federal government to this point.  Nor was the federal intervention into the EA of the 
proposed Alberta-Pacific pulp mill on the Athabasca River.  The Alberta Department of the 
Environment, now under Ralph Klein, found an ally in the Department of Federal and 
Intergovernmental Affairs, which pushed for passage of the proposed Environmental 
Protection and Enhancement Act as a way to weaken federal justification for intervention 
(Winfield, 1994).  The growing debate over the James Bay II project would, however, test 
Ottawa’s new stance. 
5.1.3 The James Bay II Project 
 
 While this research does not directly examine the development of Quebec’s EIA 
legislation, there is still value in observing the course of events concerning Phase Two of 
the large James Bay hydroelectric development following the Rafferty-Alameda and 
Oldman court decisions.  Canadian federalism has to a significant extent been shaped by 
the ‘Quebec factor;’ not only the frequent demand for decentralization, but also the need to 
demonstrate to a large, politically mobilized linguistic minority that they can be 
accommodated within the Canadian federation.  Considering that the late ‘80s and early 
‘90s also witnessed attempts by Prime Minister Mulroney to get Quebec to sign onto the 
Constitution, one might expect that, if the federal government were to actively seek to 
avoid conflict with any province, it would be Quebec.  Viewed from a different perspective, 
one might say that, if the federal government, led by a Prime Minister and three 
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consecutive Environment Ministers from Quebec, was illing to battle Quebec over the 
environment in the middle of this period of megaconstitutional politics, the other provinces 
could not have been particularly reassured. 
 Ottawa’s position, however, fluctuated dramatically and reinforces the point that 
federal unilateralism in EIA is undertaken only reluctantly.  The crux of the debate 
revolved around the Quebec government’s desire to divide the environmental review into 
two stages, first considering the impacts of roads, irports and marine terminals and then 
analyzing the rest of the project.  Since an estimated $600 million would have been spent 
by the time stage two of the review was undertaken, environmentalists were suspicious of 
whether cancellation of the project would be seriously considered (Harrison, 1996).  Lucien 
Bouchard, now leader of the Bloq Québécois, nevertheless continued his support for federal 
intervention: “For the time being, Ottawa has powers and jurisdiction in the environment, 
and it might be that even some nationalists in Quebec must thank God for that, because 
Quebec is not taking care of the environment now” (Montreal Gazette, Oct, 30th, 1990).  
Indeed, Quebec Environment Minister Pierre Paradis broke ranks and argued first for a 
single review and then for a federal review under the James Bay Northern Quebec 
Agreement (JBNQA), which was believed to be more rigorous than the EARPGO because 
of the requirement for the Cree and Inuit to be co-signatories to the review (Montreal 
Gazette, Nov. 23rd, 1990).  Unfortunately, Bouchard’s successor as federal Environment 
Minister, Robert de Cotret, also changed his mind accepted a two-stage review.  His 
successor, Jean Charest, reversed course again and announced a full independent federal 
EA of the project (Toronto Star, July 18th, 1991). 
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 One of the major reasons for this resort to unilateralism was the consistent 
opposition of the Cree in Northern Quebec to the project.  Phase One of the James Bay 
project, completed in 1971, had had significant andwi e-ranging environmental impacts 
despite assurances from the province that impacts would be limited, including destruction 
of habitat of a variety of species which led to depopulation of species on which the Cree 
depended to hunt (House of Commons, May 30th, 1989).  Now, the Cree launched a legal 
action to force the federal government to apply their authority under the JBNQA.  Once 
again the federal government stood with a province to argue that the EA was outside their 
jurisdiction and that any federal concerns could be incorporated into a provincial study.  
Justice Rouleau of the Federal Court, however, found many areas of federal jurisdiction 
that would be affected, including Indians and India l nds, migratory birds, marine 
mammals and fisheries, and added that the actions of the two governments “…w[ere] 
intended both to appease and circumvent the native populations” and seemed to be 
“…attempt[s] to free themselves from the duties and responsibilities imposed under the 
[JBNQA]” (Cree Regional Authority et al v Attorney-General of Quebec [1991]).  The 
eventual EA, prepared by Hydro-Quebec, was therefore submitted to three committees - 
two constituted under the JBNQA and one under the EARPGO - and was deemed 
inadequate by all three in late 1994.  Revision of the EA was rendered unnecessary, 
however, when a lobby of environmentalists and Cree succeeded in convincing the 
governments of New York and Maine to cancel their contracts, effectively killing the 
project (Skogstad, 1996). 
 While hardly distinguishing itself as an enthusiastic participant, by 1992 the federal 
government was firmly entrenched in EIA.  Six years p ior, the emphasis had been on 
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process substitution through agreements such as the 1986 pact with Alberta and the 
avoidance of duplication.  Increased public attention, peaking in July 1989, had encouraged 
the development of a legislated EIA process, but without the Rafferty-Alameda and 
Oldman River dam cases is it highly unlikely, given the tradition of federal deference, that 
events would have unfolded the same way.  The courts had made it clear that, if a 
provincial process was to serve as a substitute for a federal EA, it must meet the 
requirements of the latter.  This included an emphasis on transboundary effects and 
Aboriginal rights, both of which were seen as key concerns of a federal assessment.  With 
such a firm legal backing, as well as high – though decreasing by 1991 – public concern, 
Ottawa had shown some uncharacteristic backbone: Th perceived humiliation of de 
Cotret’s inability to stop construction of the Rafferty-Alameda dams in Saskatchewan led to 
clauses in the CEAAct which strengthened the power of the Minister of the Environment; 
Charest abandoned the stance of his predecessor in favour of a unilateral federal EA over 
the James Bay II project; and the federal government r jected provincial calls for 
delegation of authority through equivalency agreements.  Like it or not, Ottawa was now 
the holder of significantly more power in EIA and the provinces would have to deal with 
this new reality. 
5.2 Harmonization and the Provincial Response 
 
 The tactics adopted by the provinces represent a shift from outright rejection of 
federal jurisdiction to an attempt to minimize federal involvement.  The provincial 
recommendations for amendments to Bill C-78 submitted by BC Environment Minister 
John Reynolds (Provincial/Territorial Working Group, 1990) can be seen as such an 
attempt.  Bill C-78 would die on the order paper but would be reintroduced and passed as 
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Bill C-13 in 1991.  The provincial recommendations included the aforementioned 
equivalency agreements, under which the federal government could transfer an EA to a 
province where the processes were “equivalent and comparable,” although the final 
decision would remain with the federal responsible authority [proposal H].  The provinces 
also recommended that procedures and requirements for joint review panels be decided on 
jointly by federal and provincial Ministers [proposal E] and that there be a cooperative 
scoping process under which the federal government would consult with a province when 
an EA is required [proposal G].   
A variety of authors are skeptical of the effects of such a delegation of federal 
authority.  Andrews and Hillyer (1990) of the West Coast Environmental Law Association, 
for example, express serious reservations about all three of these proposals, fearing that a 
jointly decided procedure for review panels could alow for deviation from the federal 
commitment to such things as funding for public participants, while a cooperative scoping 
process would allow provinces a formal say in federal EAs which require no provincial 
involvement.  They also argue that the term “comparable” is meaningless and that 
equivalency agreements would force responsible authorities into making decisions based on 
information provided by organizations outside federal supervision or control.  Hazell 
(1998) sees the potential for equivalency agreements to lead to “… the balkanization of 
environmental assessment in areas fully within federal constitutional authority” (p. 57).  In 
any event, the only one of these recommendations to appear in the CEAAct is the proposal 
for joint requirements for a panel review.  The CEAAct does state, however, that the 
members of the panel must be unbiased [41(b)] and that the public must be given an 
opportunity to participate [41(e)]. 
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While the provinces enjoyed limited success in terms of influencing the federal 
legislation itself, the CCME offered a much better opportunity to restrain federal 
unilateralism.  The CCME was created in 1988 out of he Canadian Council of Resource 
and Environment Ministers and focuses on “…promot[ing] effective intergovernmental 
cooperation and coordinated approaches to interjurisdict onal issues” (CCME, 2004).  
Through its policy of revolving chairmanship and emphasis on developing mutually 
acceptable ‘national’ standards, the CCME attempts to cast itself as less of a federal-
provincial-territorial entity than as of 13 jurisdictions working together.  Its priorities are 
reflected well in the Statement of Intergovernmental Cooperation on Environmental 
Matters (STOIC) which emphasizes collaboration, partnership, information-sharing and a 
commitment to act on environmental matters while respecting each other’s jurisdiction 
(CCME, 1991).  Several authors, however, are highly critical of the CCME, with Harrison 
(1996) observing that Alberta and Quebec - whom one might think would take offence to 
an agreement which recognizes that “both the Parliament of Canada and the provincial 
legislatures have legislative authority enabling them to regulate matters relating to the 
environment” (CCME, 1991, p. 4) – were in fact strong proponents of the STOIC.  The 
CCME norm of consensual decision-making, with every ju isdiction effectively holding a 
veto, seems a very good explanation for this support.  By binding the federal government 
into a multilateral forum undesirable federal initiatives are perhaps easier to resist 
(Skogstad, 1994).  Winfield (2002) is further skeptical of the actual goal of the 
harmonization initiative, noting that it occurred at  time when many provincial 
Environment Ministries were undergoing severe budget cuts, typically much more severe 
than Environment Canada.  This feeling that environme tal protection is occasionally 
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compromised to further intergovernmental harmony motivates much of the opposition to 
harmonization. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman River court cases 
and the development of the CEAAct, the CCME approach to EIA was what Kennett (2002) 
describes as “process coordination.”  In contrast to the aforementioned contrasting idea of 
“process substitution,” the Framework for Environmental Assessment Harmonization 
(CCME, 1992) allowed for bilateral agreements which coordinated aspects of the federal 
and provincial processes, such as timetables and joi t panel reviews.  Significantly, both 
processes remained unchanged under the agreements and any coordinated activity had to 
meet the legal requirements of both governments.  This meant that if the two processes 
were not compatible at some steps, they would remain uncoordinated.  Kennett (2002) 
notes that the federal comprehensive study stage, which may add three months to the EIA 
process, has no parallel in Alberta.  Under the process coordination model, the federal EA 
would therefore diverge from the provincial process if a comprehensive study was seen as 
necessary.  In addition to the 1993 agreement with Alberta, the federal government signed 
two other bilateral agreements under the Framework: with Manitoba in 1994; and with 
British Columbia in 1997.  Hazell (1998) sees the agreements as a step forward for the 
federal government because of their recognition of both federal and provincial jurisdiction 
in EIA: “…in a sense, the federal and respective provincial governments are equal and are 
treated as equals…” (p. 94).  He is, however, critical of the later Canada-British Columbia 
Agreement for Environmental Assessment Cooperation (1997) because it allowed the 
federal government to delegate a screening or a comprehensive study to the province [7].  
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In this sense, it resembled the process substitution m del adopted in the negotiations over 
the CWA going on at that time.   
Arguments in favour of harmonization through process ubstitution almost 
inevitably focus on the elimination of unnecessary duplication.  Indeed, this was the 
predominant concern about increased federal involvement expressed by all provincial 
environment officials interviewed and should serve to reinforce once again the strong link 
between environmental protection and economic development at the provincial level.  In 
the words of one provincial official: “They’re duplicating what we’ve done for 30 years” 
(Crook, 2004); according to another: “The biggest issue is timing … [Federal approval 
processes] are often 30 days behind the provincial process” (Lechner, 2004).  Such 
arguments are indicative of a provincial concern that has been apparent at least since 1990.  
Appearing at that time before the House of Commons Committee to Pre-Study Bill C-78, 
Environment Minister John Reynolds of BC warned that e recent federal intervention was 
leading to “…a sense of instability which is especially disturbing at a time when we face a 
downturn in the economy” and that “[i]ndustry is coming to a standstill in Canada because 
of some of our processes … the situation is so wide open now that anybody can go to court 
and delay things for months and months” (House of Cmmons, Dec. 4th, 1990).  This 
position was reaffirmed a decade later when another Provincial/Territorial Working Group 
(2000) compiled a list of projects which they judge had been needlessly delayed through 
late federal intervention or duplication to meet overlapping federal and provincial 
standards. 
Others, however, have questioned the severity of the problems of overlap and 
timing.  A CEAAgency official acknowledged the existence of a problem but stated: 
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“…you have to look at the perspective it’s coming from.”  The official commented on the 
existence of groups whose sole purpose was to guide companies through the EIA process as 
efficiently and cost-effectively as possible and who were capable of exerting a significant 
amount of pressure on provincial contacts.  Meanwhile, the official stated that, in many 
Alberta oilsands projects, the proponent was often either unwilling to disclose their entire 
mine plan or did not provide detailed enough information, which meant that the federal 
process either had to incorporate previously unforeseen considerations or that a federal 
Department would have to conduct supplementary information gathering.  Finally, the 
official argued: “The companies make a song and dance about how oil drives the Alberta 
economy and we know that,” but that CEAAact standards needed to be adhered to 
(MacDonald, 2004).  This relationship between provincial governments and industry has 
been seized upon by a significant portion of the enviro mental community as a sign that the 
former are too closely tied to economic development (Burgess, 2004). 
Gibson (2002) further notes that the federal process often considers aspects left 
unaddressed by the provincial process.  To return to Alberta for a relevant example, the 
Alberta Environmental Appeal Board (2003) decision concerning projects proposed by 
Inland Aggregates Ltd. and Lafarge Canada Inc. was criticized by environmental groups 
because licences were granted under the EPEA without t e opportunity for referral to a 
public panel – something available for all projects overed by the CEAAct (MacDonald, 
2004).  This consistency of application across the country was also cited as a strength of the 
federal process by a national CEAAgency official (Burgess, 2004).  
As the court rulings of the early 1990s made clear th t a provincial process which 
did not fulfill the requirements of a federal EA could not be considered its substitute, the 
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provinces began pointing to their respective initiatives in EIA as a sign that equivalency 
was possible.  Alberta Environment Minister Ralph Klein appeared on behalf of the CCME 
and condemned the federal rejection of the provincial cooperative scoping and equivalency 
agreement proposals described above.  Noting that the CCME was concerned over possible 
federal intrusion into decision-making concerning provincial natural resources, Klein 
stated: “The provinces are now putting in place processes that would be equivalent or 
perhaps even better than the processes proposed by the federal government, and that ought 
to be recognized” (House of Commons, Nov. 19th, 1991).  Klein also recommended that the 
judge of what is “equivalent” be the CCME.  During the five-year review of the CEAAct, 
the provinces continued to ask for equivalency agreements and for a legislative provision 
allowing for “…the exemption of the application of the CEAA, aspects of CEAA or issues 
already addressed by other processes” (Provincial/Territorial Working Group, 2000, 
‘Recommendations Report,’ p. 8).  The basis for these and other requests was that:  
[t]he provinces and territories have made substantial advances in the practice of 
environmental assessment in their respective jurisdict ons since CEAA was first enacted … 
adjustments to CEAA are required to recognize and accommodate the improvements to 
provincial environmental assessment legislation and practice… (Provincial/Territorial 
Working Group, 2000, ‘Trends in Environmental Assessment,’ p. 28). 
 
 
 Provincial concern over the impact of increased federal involvement occasionally 
manifested itself in an explicit linkage between federal actions and provincial reforms.  
This was most apparent in British Columbia and Alberta.  In the case of the former, an 
official argued that the court cases that contributed to a heightened presence around 1990 
did not adequately consider the constitutional separation of powers between the 
governments.  This official acknowledged that this eightened presence was “clearly a 
major factor” behind the four-year process that result d in the 1995 BCEAA and helped 
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jumpstart what had been a failed attempt to streamline the three EIA processes in place in 
1990 (Crook, 2004).  In the case of the latter, a federal regional official believed that: 
“Alberta so jealously guards its jurisdiction that … it’s driven Alberta to actually have 
much better standards.  If nothing else, I think they keep one step ahead of everybody else 
for that reason” (MacDonald, 2004).  This certainly fits in with Winfield’s (1994) findings, 
mentioned above, of collaboration between the Ministry of Federal and Intergovernmental 
Affairs and Alberta Environment to develop the EPEA. 
 A different attitude towards on this issue was evid nt in the other three provinces 
examined.  Jurisdictional infringement was not seen as a significant problem by either the 
official from Saskatchewan or Manitoba and both emphasized the positive overall nature of 
their dealings with the federal government.  Apart from the desirability of having federal 
transboundary provisions to serve as a back-up in case their interests are overlooked by 
neighbouring provinces (Lechner, 2004), which was di cussed above, both officials 
referred positively to joint committees which operat  with federal participation.  In the case 
of Manitoba, it was indicated that greater federal involvement has actually helped the 
province develop a stronger cumulative effects assessm nt process because of the addition 
of CEAAgency resources (confidential interview, 2004).  Ontario reported considerable 
concern over both overlap and jurisdictional infringement, but did not attribute any of its 
reforms to federal action (Ireland & Macchione, 2004). 
 While concern over overlap and, in some cases, juri diction seem to be a key factor 
in explaining provincial support for harmonization, federal support seems once again tied to 
a desire not to aggravate intergovernmental relations.  Perhaps seeking to capitalize on this 
desire, the Provincial/Territorial Working Group (2000) remarks that acceptance of its 
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recommendations: “…has the capacity to demonstrate that federalism works” 
(‘Recommendations Report,’ p. 5).  In 1993, therefor , despite the previous arrangements 
under the Framework for Environmental Assessment Harmonization, the CCME was 
charged with negotiating a new harmonization agreement.  It soon announced an initiative 
with the top priority of: “clarifying federal-provincial roles and responsibilities; elimination 
of duplication and overlap; and harmonization of legislation, regulations and policies” 
(CCME, 1993).  As a perhaps simplistic example of the participants’ focus, Theme One of 
the report was “Enhancing Cooperation Amongst Governm nts” while “Managing 
Environmental Issues” came later as Theme Two (CCME, 1993).  Several authors argue 
that achieving environmental harmony only became more prominent under the Chrétien 
government, especially following the 1995 Quebec referendum when demonstrating that 
federalism works became tied to a program of non-constitutional renewal (Winfield, 2002; 
Fafard, 1997).  Harrison (2002a) describes the pressu  from the Prime Minister’s Office 
and from the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Stéphane Dion, around this time to get 
a deal done. 
The eventual deal – the CWA, signed in January 1998 by all Canadian governments 
except Quebec – has been criticized by some for permitting the federal government to 
abdicate some of its responsibility over environmental policy.  Indeed, this criticism helped 
undo the CWA’s predecessor, the EMFA, which was abandoned after public consultations 
in January 1996.  What is of greatest relevance heris the accompanying Sub-Agreement 
on Environmental Assessment (SAEA) and the subsequent bilateral agreements between 
Ottawa and the four western provinces.  In contrast to the earlier Framework for 
Environmental Assessment Harmonization, the SAEA adopts a process substitution 
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approach for projects that require more than one ass ssment.  The goal of the SAEA is to 
ensure that only one EIA process be applied to a project. 
The bilateral agreements ensure coverage of the areas which the courts had focused 
on in the court cases of the early 1990s.  All four f the agreements – with Alberta 
(Canada-Alberta Agreement for Environmental Assessment Cooperation, 1999), 
Saskatchewan (Canada-Saskatchewan Agreement for Environmental Assessment 
Cooperation, 1999), Manitoba (Canada-Manitoba Agreement for Environmental 
Assessment Cooperation, 2000) and BC (Canada-British Columbia Draft Agreement for 
Environmental Assessment Cooperation, 2003) – make explicit commitments that other 
jurisdictions potentially subject to transboundary effects will be invited to participate in the 
EA and that affected Aboriginal groups will be similarly invited.  The Agreement with BC 
(2003) is the most detailed concerning transboundary effects, providing for the early 
exchange of information if the federal government feels that the transboundary provisions 
in the CEAA may apply to an EA [32].  In terms of Aboriginal involvement, the Agreement 
with Alberta (1999) goes beyond a simple commitment to allow participation, specifying 
that this will include:  
opportunity to participate in a consultation program for the preparation of the 
environmental assessment report, to provide written comments at the appropriate stage of 
the environmental assessment, and to appear at a public hearing if one is convened [12.1]. 
 
Each agreement also details the requirements for public involvement and for the legal 
requirements of both jurisdictions to be met.  Those officials interviewed almost 
unanimously specified the clarifying of roles and responsibilities as the major incentive 
behind the bilateral agreements, although a federal official agreed that the relatively more 
detailed Canada-Alberta agreement (1999) was a reflection of the strength of Alberta’s EIA 
process (MacDonald, 2004). 
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One of the more controversial elements of this plan is that there be a lead party who 
administers the EA in accordance with their process.  While the other parties are consulted 
and retain their decision-making authority, it is the lead party who establishes timelines, 
gathers information and decides which environmental effects need to be incorporated in the 
EA for all parties to make their respective decision  [5.7.0].  It should be noted, however, 
that both the SAEA and all bilateral agreements requi  that a definition of “environmental 
effects” that meet the definitions of both the federal and provincial governments involved 
be adopted and the CWA states:  
nothing in this Accord alters the legislative or other authority of the governments or the 
rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative or other authorities 
under the Constitution of Canada [9]. 
 
Nevertheless, there have been concerns expressed that the SAEA and the bilateral 
agreements mean a decreased federal presence due to the role of the lead party.  The federal 
government is only automatically the lead party when the proposed project is on federal 
lands.  Otherwise, the lead party is the province or territory if it is within their boundaries.  
There are, however, a series of “best-situated” criteria that may alter who is appointed lead 
party.  The criteria include “scale, scope and nature of the environmental assessment,” 
“physical proximity of the government’s infrastructre,” “ability to address client or local 
needs” and “interprovincial, interterritorial or international considerations” [5.6.4].  Kennett 
(2002) believes this clause will lead to even fewer situations in which a federal Department 
is the lead party.  In the interviews conducted, there was not a single case offered where 
there had been a federal lead party since the signing of a bilateral agreement.  
For critics of this arrangement, the situation is exacerbated by the lack of oversight 
or enforcement provisions.  Originally, there had been agreement to develop Canada-wide 
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standards for the content of an EA as well as accountability mechanisms to ensure that the 
legal requirements of all processes involved in an EA were met (CCME, 1996).  Neither 
have come into being.  An Alberta official commented that discussions relating to the 
former stalled because the federal proposal was based on the CEAAct model, which 
differed significantly from the provincial processe in some areas (North, 2004).  When 
asked during a hearing of the Standing Committee on the Environment and Sustainable 
Development (SCESD) why no enforcement provisions were included in the CWA, Ian 
Glen, then-Deputy Minister of Environment Canada, attributed it to “political” reasons, 
stating that enforcement was seen as less of a priority (House of Commons, Oct. 20th, 
1997).   
The SAEA further contains a curious clause that state : “The Parties agree to seek to 
amend their legislation and/or assessment processes as necessary to comply with their 
obligations under the terms of this Sub-agreement” [5.12.0].  What this means exactly is 
not quite clear.  Sid Gershberg, then-President of the CEAAgency, testified before the 
SCESD that no changes to the CEAA would be necessary (House of Commons, Oct. 20th, 
1997).  The amended 2003 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act adds as one of its 
purposes: “to promote cooperation and coordinated action between federal and provincial 
governments…” [4(2)(b.2)], though the effect of this clause is also unclear.  The eventual 
SCESD report (House of Commons, 1997) recommended an explicit provision in the 
SAEA confirming that no amendment to the CEAAct was required, but this did not occur.  
One possible explanation is that, given the emphasis by the Provincial/Territorial Working 
Group (2000) on avoiding legal challenges, this clause serves as an attempt to minimize 
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situations in which two governments can be forced into conducting separate assessments by 
a court ruling.   
The SCESC report (House of Commons, 1997) is also critical of several other 
aspects of the CWA.  The SCESC finds insufficient evid nce of overlap to merit its key 
role in the Accord, noting instead that greater emphasis should be placed on identifying 
areas where there is not enough coverage under Canada’s EIA processes as well as ensuring 
that application of the CWA does not compromise this coverage.  And while the Deputy 
Minister of Environment Canada argued that no devolution would occur as a result of the 
Accord, the Committee remains unconvinced, seeing the CWA as potentially leading to the 
surrender of a significant number of important federal powers in EIA.  It should be noted 
that, based on the interviews conducted, no significant devolution of authority has been 
detected.  In the case of Aboriginal involvement, for example, the federal Responsible 
Authority must still examine proposals for possible violations of treaty rights and has the 
authority to conduct a consultation process entirely separate from the EA if needed 
(Burgess, 2004). 
The pattern that can therefore be observed throughout t e 1990s is one of a return to 
intergovernmental harmony through agreements that are less conducive to federal 
unilateralism.  While agreements earlier in the deca , such as the Framework for 
Environmental Assessment Harmonization (CCME, 1992) were structured around 
coordinating two different EIA processes where possible, the later CWA and the SAEA aim 
at eliminating one process entirely.  The focus of the latter agreements on eliminating 
duplication, despite a persistent debate about how much of it actually exists, reaffirms the 
importance Canadian governments place on cooperation.  As has been seen, the motives 
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behind support for cooperation vary; with the provinces motivated by concerns over 
overlap and, to a varying extent, jurisdiction while the federal position has often been tied 
to the larger political goal of reducing intergovernmental conflict.   
A key argument by both governments has been that this cooperation will not come 
at the price of environmental protection.  Provincially, both Klein’s arguments on behalf of 
the CCME before the Legislative Committee on Bill C-13 (House of Commons, Nov. 19th, 
1991) and the Provincial/Territorial Working Group’s (2000) recommendations for reform 
to the CEAAct emphasized that improvements to provincial EIA processes deserved to be 
recognized.  As was discussed above, officials in both BC and Alberta suggested that the 
increased federal involvement since 1990 was a significa t reason for such improvements.  
It is with the hope of elaborating on this theme that trends in public opinion around 1990 
will now be examined.   
5.3 Trends in Public Opinion 
 
 Having argued that federal actions have an important, if varying, effect on the 
development of provincial EIA processes, it is necessary to consider the possibility that 
these developments can be explained in an alternative fashion.  One such argument which 
seems especially plausible would be that the different orders of government respond 
independently to similar pressure from public opinion.  Such a conclusion would provide 
strong support for advocates of a more collaborative approach to Canadian federalism, 
since conflict is largely redundant and only inhibits the implementation of the separate 
processes.  As will be seen, however, public opinion data from around 1990 does not 
adequately support such an assertion.  Ultimately, these results further support the 
conclusion arrived at in the previous section. 
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 Measuring concern for the environment can be gauged by public response to two 
questions: how concerned people are when directly asked about the environment; and how 
many people list the environment as their most important concern.  Doern and Conway 
(1994) state that Decima Research polls conducted for the federal government in 1985 
indicated that citizens were increasingly concerned about environmental issues when 
directly asked to rate their level of concern.  Gallup Canada polls note a rising concern 
about pollution, but do not ask specifically about ‘environment’ until 1988. Figure 5.1 
tracks the percentage of people who responded that they were “very concerned” about the 
environment.  It should be noted that, from 1975 to 1987, the average percentage of 
respondents who regarded pollution as being a “very s ious” problem was around 52% 
(Gallup Canada, June 1st, 1987).  The five years from 1987 to 1992, then, witnessed a 
significant rise in public concern, which at its peak resulted in nearly 80% of respondents 
seeing environmental degradation as a very serious problem, before tapering off and 
returning to lower levels after 1992.   
Figure 5.2 adds in the regional breakdown of respondents.  While Ontario, British 
Columbia and the Prairies each experienced an overall rise in public concern during this 
period, the results raise several questions.  On the basis of these results alone, one might 
expect that Ontario – which regularly exceeds the natio al average in terms of the 
percentage of respondents who are “very concerned” about the environment – to be at the 
forefront of reform in EIA.  Yet, although the Ministry of the Environment formed a task 
force to recommend changes to the EIA process, it was not until 1996 that the OEAA was 
amended.  And as previously mentioned, this 1996 amend ent – with its focus on greater 
efficiency – has been criticized as a step in the wrong direction (Valiante, 1996).   
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Conversely, while it is unfortunate that Gallup Canada chooses to lump together 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba as the “Prairies,” someone looking at these results 
might be surprised to learn how quickly Alberta acted in the wake of the Rafferty-Alameda 
and Oldman River decisions.  The relatively high stringency of the ensuing EPEA also 
stands in marked contrast to the consistently lower concern expressed here by Prairie 
respondents.  British Columbia’s MPRP and MDAA could be attributed to increased public 
concern, although BC respondents’ level of concern is certainly the most erratic of the three 
regions.  The relatively stringent BCEAA, however, only came into force in 1995.  
While Gallup Canada is sadly short of regional breakdowns detailing the percentage of 
people who cited the environment as “the most important problem facing this country 
today,” what information is available suggests a similar pattern as described above.  Prior to 
1987, the number of people choosing the environment as “ he most important problem” was 
not even 1% (Gallup Canada, Jan. 14th, 1991).  Figure 5.3 illustrates how this rate peaked at 
17% in July 1989, surpassing unemployment for the only time in Canadian history, before 
descending to its more traditional total of 2% in late 1991.  In June 1988, when the national 
average stood at 8%, the regional averages were  as follows: Ontario, 12%; Prairies, 3%; 
BC, 2%.  And again in March 1989, when the national average was 16% the regional 
averages were: Ontario, 16%; Prairies, 10%; BC, 17%.  As with concern over the 
environment, therefore, each region did experience an increase in the importance 
respondents attributed to environmental issues.  However, if EIA reform in the provinces 
occurs independently of federal reform, then one might expect the pace and breadth of 
reform to be determined by the extent of public concer .  This would not be an accurate 
measure of what really occurred. 
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 It is also interesting to note how short-lived heightened public concern proved.  
Figures 5.1 and 5.3 both show that national public concern was only trending upward or 
remaining level for two or three years.  Indeed, by the time of the Oldman River dam 
Supreme Court ruling in 1992, public concern was rapidly returning to more traditional 
levels.  Many reform processes were initiated in these three years, but there has been some 
suggestion that government officials felt the degre of public concern was overblown.  de 
Loë (1999), for example, argues that by 1987 the Alberta government was increasingly 



































 This chapter aimed at exploring political and lega developments since the late 
1980s in an attempt to determine the evolution of intergovernmental relations in EIA and 
the role of increased federal involvement in the legislative and policy changes at the 
provincial level.  Section 5.1 described the series of court cases that surrounded the 
construction of the Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman River dams as well as the James Bay II 
hydroelectric project.  In each case, the courts emphasized areas in which the provincial 
EIA process was deficient in meeting federal obligations, whether it be transboundary 
effects or Aboriginal or public involvement.  The nt result was that the federal government 
– albeit unwillingly – began to conduct a much larger number of EAs.  At the same time, 
the development process of the CEAAct took on a gret d al more significance, especially 
with Ottawa’s rejection of collaborative scoping and equivalency agreements. 
 As section 5.2 described, the assertion of federal authority disrupted the existing 
order in EIA where the federal government played a largely supporting role.  The 
provincial response, in effect, took place at two levels: first, at the multilateral level – either 
interprovincially or in negotiations with the federal government; and second, at the 
individual provincial level.  At the multilateral level, the provincial response was to deviate 
from their previous position of outright rejection f federal jurisdiction to a position of 
reemphasizing the importance of elimination of duplication and overlap.  The ensuing 
revitalization of the CCME led to an emphasis on harmonization that initially resulted in 
bilateral agreements stressing coordination between th  federal and provincial processes.  
During the mid-1990s, however, under a federal governm nt committed to demonstrating 
that Canadian federalism could work, the signing of the CWA and its accompanying SAEA 
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changed the focus back to pre-1990s process substitution.  Throughout this period, and 
again during the five-year review of the CEAA in 2000, the provinces argued for process 
substitution and equivalency as recognition of their r forms in EIA.  At the provincial level, 
concern about federal involvement seems to have played an important role in the 
development of the more stringent BCEAA and EPEA in British Columbia and Alberta 
respectively.  In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, however, where no new legislation has been 
enacted since the 1980s, concern about federal involvement seemed less prominent.  
Indeed, several positive aspects of this involvement were noted.  In Ontario, concern about 
overlap and jurisdictional infringement certainly rivaled concerns in the two westernmost 
provinces, this does not appear to have translated in o legislative or policy reform. 
 Combined with the regional breakdown of public opinion trends provided in section 
5.3, then, the evidence presented seems to indicate an important yet varying role for 
federalism in explaining the development of the EIA processes examined.  The fact that 
public concern for the environment was consistently lowest in the Prairie provinces is 
certainly not reflected in the early and aggressive reforms made by the Alberta government.  
At the same time, Saskatchewan and Manitoba seemed to have developed a strong working 
relationship with the federal government which has strengthened the EIA process when 
both governments are involved without significant provincial reform.  The implications of 







Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 Environmental impact assessment and the broader commitment to some sort of 
sustainable development that it represents are now entrenched along with federalism as 
factors in the way Canada operates.  The objective of this research was to explore the 
relationship between the two by looking at a period of high activity in EIA reform.  It has 
done so with the hypothesis that the increased level of federal involvement at this time 
contributed to the corresponding increases in stringency in provincial EIA processes.  
Chapter 2 described how the relevant literature surrounding such a hypothesis can be 
categorized in terms of two broad debates: whether collaboration or competition is the ideal 
intergovernmental relationship in a policy area with divided jurisdiction; and whether 
centralization or decentralization will allow for more stringent environmental protection.  
EIA, as one of the highest-profile environmental sources of intergovernmental conflict in 
the last 20 years, offered the opportunity to examine the consequences of this lack of 
clarity.  Chapter 4, then, studied the reforms to the EIA processes of the federal government 
and the five western provinces undertaken from 1985-1995 and attempted to judge when 
and where there were increases in the stringency of the processes.  Chapter 5 covered 
events during these years as well, this time focusing on the Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman 
River and James Bay II court cases, but also expanded its coverage by discussing the 
harmonization initiatives of the following years.  The consequences of these cases and the 
responses from both orders of government were discussed, as were the differences in 
provincial responses to the greater federal involvement in EIA. 
 The framework introduced in Chapter 3 can now be us d to draw several 
conclusions from the evidence presented.  Within the overall two-step process of 
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determining whether there has been a widespread move ent towards EIA reform since the 
late 1980s and then determining what role intergovernm ntal interaction played in this 
process, a variety of questions presented themselves.  Under the former, this research 
asked: which jurisdictions had a more stringent EIAprocess in 1995 than they had a decade 
earlier?  Were there specific areas of the EIA process that received attention from many or 
all of the jurisdictions during this period of reform?  Were the majority of EIA reforms 
initiated when public concern was trending upward o at its peak?  Were any reforms 
initiated when public concern was trending downward o  after it had returned to normal 
levels?  Under the latter, this research asked: did the court cases around 1990 result in a 
change in the intergovernmental method of addressing EAs where both orders of 
government were involved?  If so, what were the federal and provincial responses to this 
change?  Was there variation in responses across the provinces?  Was there a noticeable 
linking on the part of the provinces between increased stringency in EIA processes and a 
more limited federal role?  Finally, the answers to these questions will be used to reflect on 
the two broad debates of conflict versus collaborati n and centralization versus 
decentralization in this policy area. 
6.1 EIA Reform in Canada 
 
 While there was a widespread movement towards EIA reform during this period, 
the eventual outcomes were significantly varied across the jurisdictions examined.  The 
most dramatic increase in stringency was likely in Alberta, where the LSCRA, which the 
provincial government had not even felt the need to apply to the Oldman River dam, gave 
way to the EPEA, whose commitment to sustainability and decision-making mechanisms 
rank highest amongst all EIA processes addressed in terms of stringency.  The federal 
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government is certainly also noteworthy for its activity during this period, with the CEAAct 
itself being completed by 1992, but not being proclaimed until 1995 because of debate over 
its accompanying regulations.  British Columbia, meanwhile, acted the earliest in this 
period in terms of actually creating new processes, consolidating a variety of procedures 
into the MPRP and instituting the MDAA.  Considering that the latter never had any 
supplementary regulations passed, these can be seen a  mere interim reforms before the 
BCEAA became law in 1995.  By the standards put forward in this research, the EPEA and 
the BCEAA compete as the most stringent overall EIAprocesses in Canada.  By contrast, 
the other three jurisdictions – Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario – did very little in 
terms of amendments or regulations.  This must be qualified by noting that these three 
jurisdictions already had legislated EIA processes; indeed, Manitoba’s was only enacted in 
1987 and relevant regulations therefore were passed in the years after.  Saskatchewan 
created guidelines to deal with the Rafferty-Alameda EA, but the SEAA was certainly the 
least stringent of any EIA legislation by 1995.  Ontario, meanwhile, undertook an 
examination of the OEAA but changed only one aspect of the legislation, allowing the 
Environment Minister to require an EA of a private undertaking. 
 Despite the differences in the extent of the reforms instituted, it is rewarding to 
identify commonalities in changes made.  One of the more significant criticisms of EIA 
processes to emerge in the early 1990s was the need for arly identification of projects that 
would require an EA and early application of the process.  The fact that all jurisdictions 
examined had legislation devoted explicitly to EIA with generally clearer trigger 
mechanisms than before should therefore not be underestimated.  In addition, the newer 
pieces of legislation generally contained more stringent clauses concerning cumulative 
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effects, consideration of alternatives and effects and compliance monitoring.  Public 
participation clauses were given greater emphasis, with British Columbia and Manitoba 
having the most stringent such clauses.   
Of particular interest, however, is the fact that all jurisdictions analyzed with the 
exception of Saskatchewan made some sort of addition to their transboundary provisions 
during these ten years.  Indeed, it is possible to be more specific and note that all of the 
provincial additions occurred from 1990 to 1994.  Chapter 2 introduced this concept and 
listed the prevention of interprovincial spillovers such as environmentally harmful effects 
as an argument in favour of centralization.  And ineed the examination of transboundary 
effects has remained a consistent argument of advoctes in favour of a greater federal role 
in EIA.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the possibility of environmentally adverse effects from 
the construction of the Rafferty-Alameda dams occurring in Manitoba became a significant 
issue because Manitoba’s involvement in the EA had been limited.  By 1993, British 
Columbia and Alberta had created new processes with explicit transboundary provisions 
while Manitoba and Ontario had amended their existing legislation.  This concern for 
ensuring that the interests of all affected jurisdictions are incorporated into an EA is also 
visible in the harmonization agreements signed later in the decade.  In each case, the 
agreement guarantees that any possible transboundary effects will be dealt with by inviting 
the affected government to participate in the assessm nt process. 
Aboriginal involvement saw a similar increase in prominence in the early 1990s.  In 
both the Oldman River and James Bay II cases, the fed ral and provincial governments 
were criticized for neglecting Aboriginal issues.  Unlike in the case of transboundary 
effects, however, the following years did not see a widespread movement to add clauses 
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guaranteeing Aboriginal involvement.  Only the federal government and British Columbia 
include such clauses in their legislation.  The harmonization agreements are a different 
story.  All of them make an explicit commitment to Aboriginal involvement and also state 
that the agreement may be altered by future land claim or self-government agreements.  
This point will be elaborated on in the following section.   
The fact that the Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman River and James Bay II court cases all 
occurred in the middle of heightened public concern over the environment blurs the causal 
links between increased federal involvement, public opinion and policy outcomes.  
Superficially, there appears to be significant value in surveying the chosen jurisdictions and 
contrasting the timing of the various reforms with the public opinion trends described in 
Chapter 5.  Returning to Figures 5.1 and 5.3 it is obvious that by 1988, certainly, concern at 
the national level was notably high and trending upward.  By 1992, concern was 
significantly down and falling towards more traditional levels.  The federal government 
announced in 1987 that it would seek to establish a legislated EIA process, which fits the 
image of a government responding to increased public concern.  As mentioned above, all 
provincial governments examined in this research also undertook some sort of reform 
process during these peak years.  Yet the significat differences between the degree of 
legislative and policy reform amongst the provinces do not fit comfortably with the 
regional breakdown of public opinion trends presented alongside the national totals.  Other 
factors seem to have been at work.  
Before turning directly to the role of federalism in EIA since the late 1980s, it is 
worthwhile to speak to the significance of the abovementioned court cases on the federal 
EIA process.  Chapters 2, 4 and 5 all touched on the tradition of federal deference in 
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Canadian environmental policy.  Chapter 2 described th  institutional barriers that have 
often made the development of environmental policy difficult.  While many of these 
barriers extended to both orders of government, the fed ral government has traditionally 
been further constrained by an unclear constitutional base and a desire to maintain 
intergovernmental harmony.  Chapter 4 described how the application of the federal 
EARPGO was considered discretionary until the Federal Court’s decision over the 
Rafferty-Alameda dam; a position the federal governme t joined with the provinces in 
asserting on several occasions.  Thus the EARPGO was not applied to projects such as the 
Oldman River dam despite the later findings of the courts and the federal Environmental 
Assessment Panel that the standards of public participation under the federal process had 
not been met by Alberta.  Chapter 5 noted that Enviro ment Canada’s focus in 1987 was on 
avoiding duplication, with the 1986 agreement with Alberta serving as a good example of 
the process substitution model used to achieve this end.  Chapter 5 also explained how the 
tougher enforcement provisions of the CEAAct can be se n as a consequence of the 
embarrassment suffered by the federal government due to its inability to stop construction 
of the Rafferty-Alameda dams.  And this chapter has already commented on the 
prominence given to transboundary effects and Aboriginal involvement by the court cases.   
When taken together, it is possible to speculate that, without these legal rulings after 
the federal government had committed to a legislated EIA process, the CEAAct could have 
had a much more discretionary trigger mechanism, less stringent enforcement provisions 
(which are hardly a strength of the CEAAct anyway), less of a focus on transboundary 
effects and Aboriginal involvement and perhaps clauses explicitly permitting equivalency 
agreements and collaborative scoping.  While the downside of having many of these less 
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stringent measures in place was discussed in Chapter 4, it is much more contentious to say 
that equivalency agreements and collaborative scoping are undesirable.  To defend this 
assertion, it is necessary to revisit the subject of intergovernmental interaction in this policy 
area. 
6.2 The Role of Federalism in EIA Reform 
 
An examination of the interaction between the federal and selected provincial 
governments as it relates to reform in EIA yields important – if diverse – results.  While the 
provinces were united in their opposition to the CEAAct and continued to act together 
when seeking amendments to this Act, certain aspect in heir dealings with the federal 
government point to interesting distinctions between how the increased federal involvement 
of the early 1990s affected each jurisdiction respectiv ly.  It is therefore beneficial to 
consider bilateral relations between the federal government and the individual provincial 
governments separately from the multilateral relations between the federal government and 
all of its provincial counterparts. 
6.2.1 Bilateral Relations 
 
In British Columbia and Alberta – the two provinces with the most prominent 
upward shifts in stringency – evidence was found of an element of reactivity in provincial 
reforms.  Whether motivated through a desire to avoid overlap or to dissuade possible 
federal encroachment on provincial jurisdiction, officials located in both provinces saw 
these reforms as at least partially a response to events at the federal level (Crook, 2004; 
MacDonald, 2004).  In neither province did the provincial official see the federal process as 
allowing better coverage of relevant issues during a  EA (Crook, 2004; North, 2004).   
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By contrast, in Saskatchewan and Manitoba, where legislative reforms were limited 
and the level of stringency remained fairly consistent throughout the 1990s, no such 
evidence was found.  Instead, provincial officials in both jurisdictions stressed their 
generally positive relations with the federal government and provided examples of where 
federal involvement had assisted the provincial process: through the addition of federal 
resources to the joint panel review process in Saskatchewan (Lechner, 2004); and through 
the bilateral strengthening of the CEA process in Manitoba (confidential interview, 2004).  
The relationship between intergovernmental interaction and EIA reform in Ontario 
is not well described by either of the above groups of two.  While a committee review of 
the EIA process was completed in 1991, the legislative changes to the OEAA in 1996 
seemed to focus more on achieving a more efficient and timely EIA process than on 
anything else.  Ontario was also the only jurisdiction of the ones chosen for this research 
not to intervene on Alberta’s behalf in Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada 
(Minister of Transport) [1992].   And yet the provincial officials interviewed proved as 
concerned - if not more concerned - about overlap and jurisdictional infringement than their 
provincial counterparts.  The latter was even cited as a reason for the delay in finalizing a 
bilateral agreement (Ireland & Macchione, 2004).  As was the case with the two 
westernmost provinces, the officials interviewed did not see federal involvement as 
facilitating the EIA process.   
One possible explanation for Ontario’s uniqueness in this research comes from the 
advanced nature of its EIA process at the time of the development of the CEAAct and from 
its lack of conflict with the federal government over natural resources.  By 1990, the 1975 
OEAA had been in effect for 15 years and yet was still one of the most stringent processes 
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of those examined.  Rather than fearing some form of federal involvement, therefore, it has 
been suggested that Ontario saw it as a measure that might influence other provinces to 
raise their EIA standards closer to its own (Winfield, 1994).  And in terms of natural 
resources, Ontario certainly has no parallel to Alberta’s battles with the federal government 
over the National Energy Program.  Both these factors may have helped contribute to 
Ontario’s EIA process developing relatively independ tly of the federal presence which 
influenced its provincial counterparts.  Further research on this topic would be valuable. 
The unbreakable link between natural resource development and EIA underscores a 
fundamental difference between the provincial and fe eral processes.  The provinces, as 
constitutional owners of natural resources, have EIA processes that must operate as part of 
what one official described as “…the larger governme t agenda” (Crook, 2004), where the 
environmental costs of a project are weighed against its potential economic benefits.  
Recognition of this permits a better understanding of provincial commitments to 
sustainable development, legislated timelines for aspects of the EIA process and project-
specific terms of reference for an EA that can be adapted to different cases.  Advocates of a 
greater federal role in EIA might argue that economic and political concerns hold undue 
influence at the provincial level and that statements such as “We like to be there for 
proponents” (Lechner, 2004) indicate an overemphasis on timing and efficiency.  
Provincial supporters could, however, respond by arguing that seeking to balance 
environmental and economic goals is only a recognition of the realities of EIA.   
The federal government, by contrast, does not have the same degree of regulatory 
responsibility for natural resource development.  This has contributed to the CEAAct 
becoming “…more of a pure environmental protection statute” (Crook, 2004) with little 
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consideration of economic benefits and a consistent checklist-style approach to all projects.  
It is not, therefore, surprising that environmental groups generally prefer federal 
involvement, which Harrison (1996) attributes to their perception that the federal 
government is more removed from the influence of industry.  One provincial official, for 
instance, saw Environment Canada as functioning “…essentially as an advocacy group” in 
EAs (North, 2004).  These underlying differences betwe n the federal and provincial 
processes will be discussed again following a discus ion of multilateral relations. 
6.2.2 Multilateral Relations 
 
 The net result of the Rafferty-Alameda, Oldman River and James Bay II court 
decisions was a forced recognition by both orders of government that Ottawa had sufficient 
jurisdiction over environmental policy to require participation in a wide variety of EAs.  
This ran counter to the traditional approach of defer nce discussed above and led for a short 
period of time to a system where both the federal and provincial EIA processes were used 
where an EA was required by both orders of government.  In this period, the federal 
government sporadically resisted provincial calls for decentralization of the EIA process – 
essentially for a return to the status quo.  Chapter 5 discussed how three successive federal 
Environment Ministers – de Cotret, Bouchard and Charest – gradually asserted their 
authority, culminating in Charest’s decision to unilaterally order a federal EA of the James 
Bay II project.   
 The federal assertion of authority, however, should not be exaggerated.  Even as 
Charest was announcing a federal EA over the James Bay II project, for example, the 
federal government was arguing alongside Quebec that the JBNQA, which was more 
stringent in some respects than the EARPGO, did not have the force of law.  This attempt 
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to minimize its role is consistent with the federal position adopted in the cases of the 
Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman River dams.  Even at the peak of public concern, then, the 
federal government showed ample desire to avoid intergovernmental conflict, which again 
fuels questions about how significant federal reforms might have been without the court 
cases.  Considering that the harmonization initiative hat eventually led to the CWA was 
initiated in 1993, the period in which Ottawa was prepared to act unilaterally was quite 
small. 
 Provincial reaction to the disruptive effects of the heightened federal presence in 
EIA generally fits well with traditional arguments in favour of decentralization.  Increased 
efficiency and elimination of overlap has already been mentioned in this chapter, but it is 
worth reinforcing the continued disagreement over to what extent overlap exists.  All 
provincial officials interviewed, however, reported overlap to be a significant problem and 
the provinces provided several examples of overlap in their recommendations for 
amendments to the CEAAct during its five-year review (Provincial/Territorial Working 
Group, 2000).  Yet federal officials seemed to see this problem as exaggerated and the 
federal Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (House of 
Commons, 1997) found no evidence of significant overlap in its analysis of the CWA.  
There seems to be a great deal of truth to Dwivedi an  Woodrow’s (1989) assertion that the 
importance of this issue lies largely in the eye of the beholder.   
 A second, less-prominent provincial concern was over the ability to maintain 
regional preferences.  British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Ontario, for instance, have 
legislated timelines, whereas Alberta and Manitoba do not.  Ontario continues to do EAs on 
private undertakings only at the Minister’s discretion, while Saskatchewan has chosen to 
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reform its EIA process through policy guidelines as opposed to legislative changes.  The 
development of a national model for EIA had initially been on the CCME’s agenda for 
harmonization, but did not make it to the CWA.  Given the still-significant differences 
between the six respective EIA processes examined, t would have been a complicated task 
to orchestrate the various amendments to legislation and alterations to policy necessary for 
a national model.  Nor is it clear that constraining Canada’s governments into one model of 
EIA would outweigh the loss of policy experimentation that would result.  If a national 
model had existed in the 1970s, for example, it is questionable whether Ontario could have 
produced as groundbreaking a process as the 1975 OEAA. 
 Yet there seems to be merit in the argument present d i  Chapter 2 that federal 
involvement in a policy area ensures some form of natio al standard.  Indeed, such a goal 
appears to have motivated CEAAgency officials ever since its formation (House of 
Commons, Oct. 4th 1990; MacDonald, 2004).  Recognition of Aboriginal treaty rights and 
guarantees of Aboriginal involvement, which are only present in the CEAAct and the 
BCEAA, are explicitly laid out in each of the bilateral agreements, including the draft 
Canada-Ontario agreement.  The uniform integration of these sections into all of the 
bilateral agreements seems to have been a federal priority.  This is also true of the 
transboundary provisions included in every bilateral agreement, which guarantee that an 
affected party shall be invited to participate in the EA.  And as was discussed in Chapter 5, 
the transboundary provisions included in the CEAAct are seen by some as a further 
backstop measure in case certain interests are overlo k d by a provincial EA. 
 The key provincial arguments throughout the 1990s – arguments that would ensure 
reduction of overlap, allow for regional diversity and protect provincial jurisdiction all at 
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the same time – were for equivalency agreements and collaborative scoping.  The former 
had been implemented under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act and would allow 
for near-total delegation of responsibility for the EIA process to a province.  As the 
overview of the court cases revealed, however, the provincial processes were deemed not to 
have fulfilled the requirements of a federal EA.  The obvious course of action to take for a 
province seeking to regain primary responsibility for EAs within its boundaries was to alter 
its process to fulfill the federal requirements.  Indeed, an examination of provincial 
presentations over the course of the decade – from John Reynolds’ appearance before the 
House of Commons Committee studying Bill C-78 in 1990 to the provincial/territorial 
recommendations for amendments to the CEAAct in 2000 – revealed a consistent pattern of 
highlighting provincial reforms and asserting that these reforms deserved recognition in the 
form of equivalency.   
Given the wide discrepancies between the underlying philosophies of the federal 
and provincial processes - essentially centering around the provincial need to balance 
environmental protection against its control over natural resource development – the degree 
of delegation an equivalency agreement would entail seems unwise.  Furthermore, the 
federal process does in some instances offer more stringent criteria than its provincial 
counterparts, even when compared with the most stringent provincial processes.  The 
requirement that a person or group must be “directly affected” by a proposed project to 
appeal a decision under the Alberta EPEA places a limitation on public involvement that 
has no parallel in the CEAAct. 
 The argument for collaborative scoping, which has persisted along with equivalency 
as a provincial demand up to the present day, has also been linked to protection of 
 
 115 
jurisdiction.  This link was perhaps best expressed by the Attorney-General of 
Saskatchewan during the Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of 
Transport) [1992] Supreme Court case when EAs were described as a “constitutional 
Trojan horse” allowing for federal intrusion into a v riety of provincial responsibilities on 
the basis of fairly limited areas of federal jurisdiction.  Indeed, the potential for 
infringement on provincial jurisdiction was a constant and often a divisive issue throughout 
the court cases discussed in this research.  La Forest J. – who feared that allocation of too 
much control over the environment to the federal government under the POGG clause 
could “…effectively gut provincial legislative jurisdiction” (R v Crown Zellerbach Canada 
Ltd [1988]) – later upheld the ability of a federal EA to consider factors within provincial 
jurisdiction (Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport) 
[1992]).  Iacobucci J. further reinforced this ability in the case of Quebec (Attorney 
General) v Canada (National Energy Board) [1994] by stating “…the scope of [the 
National Energy Board’s] inquiry must not be narrowed to such a degree that the function 
of the Board is rendered meaningless or ineffective.” 
 The respective bilateral agreements take different approaches to this issue.  The 
agreements with Manitoba and Saskatchewan say nothing directly about collaborative 
scoping; only committing the lead party to providing the necessary information for both 
governments.  Both the 1997 and the draft 2003 bilateral agreements with British Columbia 
contain a commitment to collaborative scoping.  The1999 bilateral agreement with Alberta, 
however, calls for the lead party to establish a project advisory review team which develops 
terms of reference for the EA, including the scope f the assessment.  The main concern 
with such clauses is the potential for the restriction of federal unilateralism in EIA.  By 
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surrendering sole responsibility for determining the scope of federal EAs in at least the 
cases of the bilateral agreements with British Columbia and Alberta, there is the potential 
that fewer factors could be examined than if a separate federal assessment process was 
conducted. This concern is aggravated by the fact that this research did not find one case 
where a federal Department acted as the lead party in a joint EA under any of the bilateral 
agreements.  Again, this is an area that would benefit from further research. 
6.3 Collaboration vs. Competition and Centralization vs. 
Decentralization 
 
 This examination of the development of Canadian EIA policy offers some 
interesting conclusions relating to the two broad debates presented in Chapter 2.  In relation 
to the first – whether collaboration or competition s desirable in a policy area with such an 
unclear constitutional division of power - the evidence suggests that it is necessary to 
distinguish between the two orders of government when considering this question.  At the 
federal level, there is little to no indication that intergovernmental competition provoked 
EIA reforms.  Instead, even at the height of public concern and at a time when the courts 
were significantly expanding the federal role in EIA, the federal government continued to 
show signs of reluctance to become more involved.  It has been argued that the explanation 
for this lies partly in the political atmosphere of the time.  As Lucas (1986) argues, the 
federal government often operates according to a “political constitution” where 
intergovernmental harmony is seen as a premium.  After the 1995 referendum, for instance, 
the Chrétien government was seeking to prove that federalism could work and several 
authors credit this attitude as partly explaining the federal push for the CWA.  One official 
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described the subsequent bilateral agreements as “…basically sewing up the country from 
West to East” (Ireland & Macchione, 2004).   
At the provincial level, evidence was found that federal actions can lead to positive 
policy reform in some cases.  British Columbia and Alberta passed highly stringent pieces 
of EIA legislation at least partially in response to events at the federal level.  Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba instituted relatively few reforms.  It seems likely that there is an element of 
provincial capacity at play: that the response of these two ‘have’ provinces was so much 
more dramatic because they financially and administrat vely could afford to take such 
action.  This is in line with Poel’s (1976) findings of the importance of socioeconomic 
factors in explaining differences in interprovincial reforms.  By contrast, the two ‘have-not’ 
provinces examined provided examples of benefits derived from federal involvement.  Such 
a distinction speaks to another aspect of the federalism literature discussed in Chapter 2, 
namely that federal involvement allows for some form of equalization of resources across 
regions.  Ontario - the third ‘have’ province - fits neither of these models but did not have a 
history of conflict over natural resources and already had a fairly stringent EIA process in 
place by 1990.  This raises a further interesting point, which is that there was no evidence 
found of interprovincial influence on EIA reforms.  That is, there was no indication that the 
1975 OEAA influenced any of the other provinces examined to reform their EIA processes. 
 It is valuable to establish further links between this research and the literature on 
federalism.  Perhaps the most appropriate theory with hich to contrast this research is 
Simeon’s (2000) model of collaborative federalism.  This model emphasizes non-
constitutional reforms and changes through two different means: “…collaboration among 
federal, provincial and territorial governments, seeking an appropriate balance among their 
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roles and responsibilities” (p.238); and “…collaboration among the provincial and 
territorial governments, with Ottawa on the sidelins” (p.238).  In relation to the latter, this 
research did find some evidence of bilateral provincial cooperation on a practical level, but, 
as mentioned above, found no evidence of interprovincial development of EIA reforms.  
Thus the findings do not support, for example, the model put forward by Turgeon and 
Vaillancourt (2002) in relation to the development of highways of national policy being 
developed interprovincially.   
The former means of collaboration is more interesting because it describes almost 
perfectly the underlying philosophy of the movement towards harmonization of 
environmental policy in place since the mid-1990s.  The CCME stresses the equality 
between the federal and provincial governments through the development of ‘national’ – as 
opposed to ‘federal’ – strategies while the CWA and its bilateral agreements attempt to 
more efficiently and effectively delineate federal and provincial roles in EIA.  The presence 
of evidence that unilateral federal action contributed to an increase in the stringency of 
some provincial EIA processes, however, supports Winfield’s (2002) warning of the danger 
in assuming that greater collaboration automatically leads to better policy outcomes.  In 
terms of EIA policy, therefore, there appears to be merit to Breton’s (1985) argument that 
“competitive federalism” can have positive outcomes. 
Such a conclusion for environmental policy is complicated by the fact that the 
federal government is generally unwilling to engage in intergovernmental competition.  
Even in the years examined, increased federal involvement in EIA had more to do with 
court rulings that pushed Ottawa into the field than any federal desire to expand its 
jurisdiction.  Given these conditions, it is questionable whether “competitive federalism” as 
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seen in a policy area such as health care has ever occurred in environmental policy.  
Instead, it seems appropriate to conclude that the unilateral federal actions in EIA around 
1990 provoked a competitive response on the part of the provinces, but that a two-way 
competitive dynamic never emerged.  
This research also has implications for the second broad debate presented in chapter 
2 concerning which level of government is better placed to implement stringent 
environmental policy and therefore whether centralization or decentralization should be 
pursued.  The evidence leads to two main conclusions.  First, there are fundamental 
differences in the way the federal and provincial governments approach EIA.  It is argued 
that these stem from the constitutional according of natural resources to the provinces.  
Within the provincial governments, EIA must always take place alongside considerations of 
natural resource development.  The unbreakable link between environmental protection and 
economic development is not as obvious at the federal l vel.  Both governments therefore 
offer equally necessary perspectives on EIA: the fed ral government perhaps more able to 
focus exclusively on environmental protection and the provincial governments presenting 
what some would say is a more realistic, integrated pproach to sustainable development.   
Second, similarly to Nemetz’s (1986) conclusion in relation to pollution control, it 
is argued here that the provincial and federal governm nts fulfill different functions in 
environmental assessment policy that the other would struggle to offer.  Centralization that 
restricted the ability for provincial policy experimentation would be detrimental to the 
development of stringent EIA policies.  Innovations such as the 1975 OEAA, the quasi-
judicial Alberta Environmental Appeals Board and the independent British Columbia 
Environmental Assessment Office might not have come to be under too centralized a 
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system.  On the other hand, federal involvement led in some cases to a form of equalization 
– or what Breton (1985) might call “competitive equality” – between the provincial 
processes.  The EIA processes of the six jurisdictions examined were of much more 
comparable stringency in 1995 than they had been ten years prior.  Within this decade, 
federal action was found to have played a significant role in provincial reforms of British 
Columbia and Alberta - those two jurisdictions which still did not have a specific piece of 
EIA legislation.  This ability to ensure some form of national standard is joined by a unique 
positioning to ensure the consideration of transboundary concerns and a constitutional 
responsibility for ‘Indians and Indian lands’ as examples of “…problems [the federal 
government] alone can resolve and is constitutionally responsible for resolving” (Breton, 
1985, p.493).  Possible limitations on the federal government’s ability to act unilaterally in 
EIA for the sake of furthering collaboration should be considered with these points in mind.   
It therefore seems logical that both collaboration and some form of competition 
have a place in a Canadian federation that must achieve a balance between centralization 
and decentralization in EIA policy.  Neither should be sought simply as an end in itself.  
This does not mean that there should be a perpetual state of war between the two orders of 
government, but that some degree of conflict and overlap should not automatically be 
regarded as a bad thing.  As concluded by the Macdonal  Commission, they are, rather, 
“…necessary consequence[s] of federalism” (Royal Commission on the Economic Union 
and Development Prospects for Canada, vol.1, p.68) that must be weighed against the 
possible benefits to be derived.  This is an important point that deserves greater recognition, 
especially in light of the previously discussed difference in the underlying philosophies of 
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the federal and provincial EIA processes.  It seems far worse that there be ‘underlap’ in 
these processes than overlap. 
 These conclusions suggest that the ability of the fed ral government to unilaterally 
intervene into EIA – or even the ability of the federal government to threaten unilateral 
action – is an important one.  Just as the provinces are better positioned to represent 
regional preferences and to weigh the environmental, economic and social costs and 
benefits of a project, so too the federal government is better positioned to use its policies 
and resources to ensure some form of national standard that provinces may exceed if they 
desire to or are able.  This should not be seen as a call for significant centralization; it is 
merely an argument that the federal government be wary of agreements that may surrender 
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